You can learn a lot of new abbreviations reading these things. Like "nuclear, biological, and chemical" = NBC. I hope this is a sign of a trend away from using WMD (weapons of mass destruction), which is now probably forever associated with Iraq's nonexistent store of such things.
Dan Reiter's summary concludes:
The central findings are that, while some of the NSS [National Security Strategy] recommendations are sound, preventive wars are not attractive policy options for addressing NBC threats. Examination of the historical record reveals that limited strikes on NBC programs are generally ineffective. Larger-scale attacks intended to overthrow a regime are sometimes successful, though their financial, human, military, and geopolitical costs (including counterproductive effects on the war on terrorism) are so substantial that they are unattractive policy choices. The financial costs are especially disturbing, given the hundreds of billions spent on regime change attacks which could more effectively be spent on other counterproliferation and counterterrorism initiatives, including ballistic missile defense, fissile material recovery, and a variety of counterterrorism initiatives such as port security.
Fortunately, the other elements of the NSS do promise to address the NBC threat effectively. Diplomacy generally has been successful at dissuading many states from acquiring NBC weapons, and persuading others to give up such weapons. Deterrence has been extremely successful at preventing the state use of NBC weapons. Some ballistic missile defense systems are showing promise of addressing short-and medium-range missile threats. Finally, evidence suggests that defensive counterterrorism measures work. The monograph recommends pursuing these policies. Regarding preventive attacks, the NBC threat might be reduced more effectively if the United States offered to make no-invasion pledges to countries such as North Korea in exchange for substantial NBC concessions, rather than considering or threatening the actual launch of such attacks.
I doubt very seriously his conclusions about the Star Wars "missile defense" boondoggle. But a lot of the other things in those paragraphs are pretty obvious. I mean, to anyone who doesn't think FOX News is a real news channel.
Sometimes understatement can be impressively effective in making important points.
His section on preventive attacks is worth quoting at some length. (This paper, like many but not all published by the SSI has a notice that since it is a government document not subject to copyright. So "fair use" isn't even a consideration with those.) Although I'm not going to quote a lot more of it right here.
Generally, preventive action means attacking to forestall a rising threat. Political scientists have long considered the phenomenon of preventive attacks, exploring in particular what factors make preventive attacks more likely.2 Preventive attacks are sometimes conflated with preemptive attacks, though the former are usually thought of as addressing medium- or long-term threats, whereas the latter are usually thought of as addressing immediate threats. Before the September 11, 2001 (9/11), attacks, the United States generally avoided launching preventive or preemptive attacks. The claim of the NSS is that new threats posed by tyrants, terrorists, and other rogue actors armed with tremendously powerful weapons like nuclear warheads make preventive attacks more essential policy options. The Cold War policy of deterrence cannot be counted on to work against these new enemies [argues the NSS], given the possibility that they may be stateless and/or suicidal in outlook. Further, even a single use of such destructive weapons against American territory or interests could be catastrophic, further emphasizing the imperative of eliminating such weapons through force before they can be used.
I would add here that he presumably means the general public, encouraged by FOX News and other Republican Party publicity outlets, isn't clear that "pre-emptive" war is considered legitimate in international law, while "preventive war" is illegal in international law, and considered a war of aggression like Germany's 1939 invasion of Poland.
He continues, in a passage that uses "preventive" war in other than the legal sense, e.g., the strikes on suspected German nuclear research facilities during the Second World War were not instance of "preventive war" in the present-day legal sense, which is clearly not how he's using the term here:
The past record of preventive attacks against NBC programs is not encouraging. Specifically, two sets of factors have worked to limit the success of such strikes. First, several attacks have been made against targets which were unlikely to acquire NBC weapons. That is, even though attacks may have been operationally successful in the sense of destroying specific targets, the spread of NBC weapons was not significantly delayed by the attack because, even in the absence of the attack, the target state was not close to acquiring NBC weapons. In short, the costs of preventive attacks were borne without reaping the benefits of reducing NBC threats. A series of attacks was launched against the nuclear program of Nazi Germany during World War II, especially against a heavy water production facility in Norway, though scientific and other errors would likely have prevented Germany from ever coming close to building an actual atomic device during the time available. The 1998 missile attacks launched by the Clinton administration against alleged chemical weapons production facilities in Sudan also likely made little difference, considering that the evidence associating the installation in question with chemical weapons production was quite weak. Further, though the 2003 invasion of Iraq was justified publicly as necessary to eliminate Saddam’s emerging NBC weapons program, the dictator had no NBC weapons or weapon production programs at the time of the war. Similarly, the 1993 and 1998 cruise missile strikes against Iraqi targets were aimed at a dormant NBC program.
