I want to add one myth to his list, the one I find most galling and least debunked: that the surge has led to the pacification of large parts of Anbar province and Baghdad. Quiescence and pacification are simply not the same thing, and this is definitely a case of quiescence. In fact, the reduction in violence we are witnessing is really a result of the U.S. discontinuing its vicious raids into insurgent territory, which have been - from the beginning of the war - the largest source of violence and civilian casualties in Iraq. These raids, which consist of home invasions in search of suspected insurgents, trigger brutal arrests and assaults by American soldiers who are worried about resistance, gun fights when families resist the intrusions into their homes, and road side bombs set to deter and distract the invasions. Whenever Iraqis fight back against these raids, there is the risk of sustained gun battles that, in turn, produce U.S. artillery and air assaults that, in turn, annihilate buildings and even whole blocks.
The "surge" has reduced this violence, but not because the Iraqis have stopped resisting raids or supporting the insurgency. Violence has decreased in many Anbar towns and Baghdad neighborhoods because the U.S. has agreed to discontinue these raids; that is, the U.S. would no longer seek to capture or kill the Sunni insurgents they have been fighting for four years. In exchange the insurgents agree to police their own neighborhoods (which they had been doing all along, in defiance of the U.S.), and also suppress jihadist car bombs.
This reinforces the sectarian divisions among Arab Sunnits, Arab Shi'a and Kurds and makes national political reconciliation - the alleged goal of The Surge when Cheney and Bush rolled it out a year ago - even less likely to be achieved.
Counterinsurgency experts have tended to rely heavily on two historical cases: the British in Malaya in the late 1950s, and the French in Algeria in the 1950s as expressed in the writings of one of its participants, the French officer David Galulla. Derived from these two historical cases into lessons learned by the counterinsurgency experts is the operational method of establishing combat outposts in areas of a country controlled by insurgents with the primary purpose of providing security and protecting the people.
In fact, this “right” way, as defined through history, was effectively and brilliantly put into practice two years ago in Iraq in the northern city of Tal Afar by the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment under Col. H.R. McMaster. It revolved around the operational method of establishing large numbers of combat outposts manned by U.S. and Iraqi soldiers throughout the city, while simultaneously isolating the city with a surrounding sand berm.
But now, a “right” way to conduct counterinsurgency operations in Iraq has become the only way. Our new operational approach in Iraq is applying, without apparent question or deep analytical thought, these historical counterinsurgency lessons and those from experience in Tal Afar and Ramadi.
Arguably, this operational approach is too little and too late. It does not take into account the reality of conditions on the ground in Baghdad: the fact that there is a civil war and that 25,000 additional combat troops are not enough to solve militarily what is essentially a political problem. To replicate Tal Afar in Baghdad would require 120,000 American troops. The recent surge in sectarian killings in Tal Afar should also teach us that there are limits even for the “right” way to conduct counterinsurgencies. Yet, we are so confident of our newly released counterinsurgency doctrine — a doctrine that was built on the writings of lessons learned by the counterinsurgency experts — that we apply it dogmatically in Baghdad. Dogma means adhering to a set of principles and tenets and applying them in an overpowering way without considering alternatives. This is what we have come to in our current operational approach in Baghdad.
