The Spring 2006 issue of the Army War College journal Parameters is now available online. One of the articles is Draining the Swamp: The British Strategy of Population Control by Wade Markel, in which he examines British colonial wars against insurgents for lesson in present-day counterinsurgency:
We would indeed do well to emulate the aforementioned characteristics of British counterinsurgency practice, but there was more to British success in Malaya than a good attitude. The key element of their success was the effective internment of the Chinese "squatter" population, the segment of Malayan society from which the insurgents almost entirely drew their strength. By interning the "squatters" in fortified "New Villages," the British and their Malayan allies were able to deny the communist insurgents access to recruits, food, and military supplies. It also allowed them to narrow the scope of their intelligence efforts, as the insurgents had to maintain contact with their base under the very noses of the Anglo-Malayan government.
This strategy was liable to abuse. In Kenya, against the contemporary Mau Mau rebellion, the British employed the same strategy as they had in Malaya, in this case interning basically all of the ethnic Kikuyu. The system of detention camps and fortified villages quickly degenerated into what historian Caroline Elkins has called "Britain's Gulag in Kenya." Eventually, the ensuing scandal forced Britain to grant independence even more rapidly than the accelerating pressures of decolonization would have anyway. Still, the colonial administration was able to defeat a much larger and more widely supported insurgency, more quickly, than it had in Malaya.
Let me see if I understand this. The goal of those wars was to maintain British colonial power. Is Britain still ruling Malaya (Malaysia)? Well, no. Kenya? Uh, not there either. In fact, Markel says in the paragraph just quoted that this approach he's recommending for emulation resulted in Britain granting independence even faster than they otherwise would have. It's certainly disputable whether these detention camps were as decisive in Malaya as the quoted statment might lead one to believe.
If these are our models for "success", the US is probably better staying out of the counterinsurgency business.
In fact, if the reader doesn't blink, Markel himself provides a suggestion that the "New Villages" in Malaya were not the most important tool in combatting the Communist-led insurgency:
The government then focused on destroying the insurgency, conducting a campaign of indirect approach. Instead of concentrating immediately upon the areas where the insurgency was strongest, Sir Gerald Templer, Briggs' successor [as British high commissioner], focused on building support for the government where the insurgency was weak. Such a policy had the advantages of gradually accreting strength to the government through enhanced economic activity. It also created the appearance of momentum, and it created a favorable contrast with conditions in areas troubled by insurgents. Of course, this policy affronted businessmen and officials in areas where the communists were strong. When, in response to their entreaties, the government attempted to attack the guerillas directly, such operations were rarely decisive. (my emphasis)
Enhanced economic development focused in areas where the insurgents' appeal was weaker built up support for the counterinsurgency?
Even as stereotypically stodgy a source as the Encyclopædia Britannica (2006) gives this review of the results:
The British struggled to suppress the insurgency by military means, including an unpopular strategy that forcibly moved many rural Chinese into tightly controlled New Villages. Although this policy isolated villagers from guerrillas, it also increased the government's unpopularity. The British finally achieved success when, under the leadership of British high commissioner Sir Gerald Templer, they began addressing political and economic grievances as well, increasingly isolating the rebels. Promising independence, British officials began negotiating with the various ethnic leaders ... (my emphasis)
I'm not saying there's nothing to learn from British colonial experience for counterinsurgency today. But I don't see that the particular British strategy in those two largely rural battlegrounds highlighted in Markel's article is any "golden bullet" for American counterinsurgency efforts in an urbanized country like Iraq.
Near the end of the article, Markel suggests the following application of these lessons in Iraq, "If events recommend a change in strategy, however, it might be possible to entice Sunnis into internment voluntarily, as an alternative preferable to being continually fought over."
Yeah, that'll work. After overthrowing Saddam, bombing the beejezus out of the country, leveling a Sunni city here and there (Fallujah), torture in Abu Ghuraib and years of backing the Shi'a parties and their death squads and torturers against the Sunnis in the fighting, the Americans and the Shi'a government are going to suggest, "Gee, pretty please, won't you consider voluntarily letting us put you in internment camps for several years?"
