Iraq War: What went wrong, let us count the ways

If you're not reading the articles and papers available at US military sites like the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), Parameters and the US Army Professional Writing Collection, you're missing out on some of the best-written, best-informed and genuinely critical pieces being done right now on the problems of the Iraq War and the GWOT (global war on terrorism). This paper published by SSI, for instance: Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War by David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker (Dec. 2005).

In this following paragraph, they say something that for most Democratic politicians would still consider unspeakable. But the fact that such considerations are being forced onto the table by events is an indication that the times they are a-changin':

However Iraq ends, the lessons drawn from the experience are likely to be very important for the American government. Probably the most likely lesson is that agencies and departments of the U.S. Government and military need to be recast to fight another such war successfully. Some suggest that the United States should beef up its "nation-building" expertise, perhaps creating a cabinet level department charged with "reconstruction and stabilization." Others argue that the army, having gotten out of the counterinsurgency business after Vietnam, needs to devote far more emphasis to training its forces to conduct those missions. A different conclusion would be to devise a national security strategy in which there is no imperative to fight the kind of war that the United States has fought in Iraq. Rather than "do it better next time," the contrary lesson would be on the order of "don't do it at all." ... Undoubtedly, too, U.S. forces may be called upon again to participate in operations to reconstruct "failed states," and U.S. forces need to think about how to do this intelligently. But consideration also needs to be given to the counterargument that developing a wide range of capabilities increases the likelihood that they will be used for unnecessary enterprises. (my emphasis)

Say what? That it's possible for the US to have too much military power? That having too much might tempt people in power to go to war in situations where it's not necessary? That American military action might sometime somehow be something other than always benevolent and good?
Yes, that's apparently what they are telling us.

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