Lessons of the Iraq War

I'm still pulling quotes from the Anthony Cordesman paper Iraq's Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War 03/23/06. He's already working on drawing military lessons from the American experience in the Iraq War. And he doesn't spare the officer corps and our infallible generals from criticism:

The US, and any military force engaging in counterinsurgency warfare, should teach at every level that stability operations and conflict termination are the responsibility of every field-grade officer. (And, for that matter, every civilian [involved in the war].)

It is stupid, as some in the US military have done, to call Iraqi insurgents cowards or terrorists because they will not fight on our terms. The same remarkably stupid attitudes appeared in 19th century colonial wars and often cost those foolish enough to have them the battle. The Mahdi's victories in the Sudan are a good case example.
... Insurgents are not cowards for fighting us in any way that does so at the highest cost to us and the least cost to them. (my emphasis)

Systems don’t win. Technology doesn't win.

Technology is a tool and not a solution. Israeli technology failed in Lebanon as US technology did in Vietnam, and some of the same IED systems that helped defeat Israel have now emerged in Iraq: twin IR sensors, shaped charges, radio-controlled devices, and foam painted to look like rocks. Like Israel, the US can use technical means to defeat many IEDs, but not enough. Moreover, it is possible that the total cost of every insurgent IED to date is still lower than that cost of one AH-1S [helicopter] that went down over Iraq. (my emphasis)

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