Robert Dreyfuss is skeptical whether anything much will come from the current round of negotiations: An Accord In Iraq? TomPaine.com 06/27/06. He also cautions against reading an approaching dawn of peace into the leaked discussion of troops drawdowns by General George W. Casey, currently the top US commander in the Iraq War:
Time will tell if the reported entente between [Iraqi Prime Minister] Maliki’s government and the insurgents takes hold. In the meantime, General Casey’s leaked forecast for a series of drawdowns of U.S. forces ought not to be seen as the beginning of the end of the U.S. occupation. Far from it. What Casey is saying is that neither the U.S. Army nor the Marines can sustain an occupation of Iraq at the level of 127,000 troops for the indefinite future. Clearly, Casey’s suggestion that up to 7,000 U.S. troops could leave Iraq in September was purely political, designed to give the Republicans a boost in advance of the elections this fall. But the larger pullout, supposedly to involve as many as 50,000 to 70,000 more troops by late 2007, is designed to create a U.S. occupation force in the range of 50,000 to 75,000 soldiers and Marines that can stay in Iraq permanently. The Washington Post said so explicitlyin its reporting on Casey, noting that a force of 50,000 to 75,000 “could be maintained almost indefinitely by the Army and Marines.”
Pat Lang (Giving Peace a Chance 06/30/06) emphasizes that any actual peace agreement would have to involve some kind of amnesty for those who had fought Americans:
The United States has rarely, if ever, taken the position that mere service in war against itself constituted criminal behavior. In a few instances after World War II individuals were held accountable and punished for their personal culpability in “crimes against humanity,” “planning and waging aggressive war,” etc., but this sanction was not applied to the men who served in the ranks. Indeed, very senior officers were held blameless for their participation in the struggle.
It is axiomatic that peace must be made with enemies, not friends. If Iraqi insurgents who have fought and perhaps killed Iraqi and coalition soldiers are excluded from the possibility of reconciliation and amnesty, then who will be left to make peace with? The answer is simple. No one. That would mean that the war will go on and on and on. In that case it would prove impossible to withdraw coalition forces for a long time.
I would add that individual soldiers who had committed war crimes were subject to prosecution after the war. Lang here is referring to the charges made against senior civilian and military leaders in the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials after the Second World War.
More specific offenses in violations of the laws and customs of war, such as murdering prisoners, were subject to prosecution. As they presumably would be under any Iraqi settlement.
But his basic point is correct. Waging war against a national enemy is not in and of itself a violation of the laws and customs of war. And its unthinkable to have a formal peace agreement where every combatant on the Iraqi side would be subject to prosecution for participating. Torturing and killing prisoners, as occurred to two American soldiers a few days ago, would be subject to prosecution, unless the particular peace agreement somehow specifies it. How likely such a prosecution would be in postwar Iraq is impossible to say at this point.
Tom Hayden chronicles how peace sentiment within the Democratic Party has progressively taken hold throughout the first half of 2006: Shifting Winds on IraqThe Nation Online 06/28/06. And, speaking in part from his own experience, he predicts new tensions among opponents of the war:
These developments leave many antiwar activists with mixed feelings, as often happens when social movements begin having political effects. There is no question that grassroots pressure and lobbying has had an impact on Iraq policy, despite the frequent assertions of politicians that they pay no attention to public pressure. However, there is a vast difference between an impact and an actual policy outcome. The impact may create a sense of buoyancy, while the ongoing killing in Iraq can trigger a morning-after despondency. The impact may even lead to troop withdrawals, but may leave American oil companies dominant.
Infighting may intensify as well, as a movement gains mainstream support. The so-called principled radicals divide from the so-called pragmatists. Fights break out over "withdraw now" versus "withdraw in six months" versus "withdraw in one year" camps, while the war itself grinds on with no end in sight. One group accuses another of "shilling for the Democratic Party." Sectarian factions battle one another over permits, microphones, speakers and demands. A coalition of factions can become a cacophony of confusion to the public. The booing of Hillary Clinton promises to have long-term consequences in bitter splits between groups and personalities who otherwise could be allies around specific agendas. The blessed community is long dead, and petty power clashes fill the void.
Hayden also mentions what will likely become part of the endgame of the Iraq War at some point, a division in policy between the Iraqi government and the US administration:
But clearly antiwar forces have been a significant factor in limiting the Administration's options as the November elections approach and with presidential politics already under way. At this point, it appears that the Kerry-Feingold Democrats are barely ahead of the Iraqi government, if at all. Hawkish Democrats and Republicans, on the other hand, might wind up staying the course, while the Iraqis themselves press for a timeline to prevent any more slaughter under occupation. If the alleged puppets become peacemakers, will the White House call them soft on terrorism?
