Iran War: The North Korean test and the state of play with Iran
Call to a Crusade
The Summer 2006 Middle East Policy is finally out, a bit late. It includes a look at Iran's nuclear program by Jahangir Amuzegar who was part of Iran's "pre-1979" government: Nuclear Iran: Perils and Prospects. Amuzegar is presumably not someone who has any great love for the Islmaic fundamentalist regime there. He gives a somewhat aggressive estimate of three years for Iran to achieve nuclear weapons capability. But he also reminds us that past predictions have been somewhat off the mark:
With respect to the time frame, opinions vary even more widely. A 1984 issue of Jane’s Defense Weekly [generally regarded as an authoritative source on weapons technology] reportedly predicted that Tehran would have the bomb within two years! Some experts in Israel have been saying firmly every year for more than ten years that Tehran would get the bomb "next year." For the past 15 years, various intelligence agencies have warned that Tehran could build a bomb in three to five years. On more than one occasion during the first half of 2006, John Negroponte, U.S. director of national intelligence, has stated that Tehran does not yet have nuclear weapons and probably will not produce or acquire the necessary fissile materials for the next ten years. A recent estimate points out that Tehran is six to nine months away from mastering the enrichment process and five to ten years from building a bomb. The latest guess is that with no major new technical problems, the task can be accomplished within three years. A report issued in March 2006 by the Institute for Science and International Security also subscribes to the three-year possibility. (my emphasis)
And he lays out the possible options for action:
The international community now has five theoretical choices, none of which is attractive or satisfactory. The first is "watchful waiting," leaving Tehran to its own devices, ignoring Ahmadinejad’s swashbuckling gestures and outrageous statements, letting Iran proceed with industrial uranium enrichment, and trying to contain the program, as in the North Korean case. The second option is to rely on continued world diplomacy i.e., furthering negotiations with the EU-3 and preferably with Washington’s participation, returning the Iran file to the atomic-energy agency in Vienna (as requested by Tehran and preferred by Russia and China) to search for some mutually satisfactory arrangements. The third alternative is for Washington and the EU-3 to invoke Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and lean on Russia and China to come up with certain legally binding and effective sanctions. Fourth, failing to get a vote out of the Security Council, Washington and the EU-3, along with "like-minded" governments, could impose their own sanctions (denying Iran such items as military equipment, dualuse technology, and foreign loans and credits). The last option would be "shock and awe," to threaten military intervention, and ultimately engage in armed intervention.
Amuzegar makes it clear that he prefers the second options, based on both positive and negative incentives.
Military strikes would be an extremely reckless option. At the time he was writing the article, the summer round of negotiations was under way, which momentarily looked as if the Cheney-Bush administration was backing away from the option of immediate military attack. Since then, things have taken a distinct turn for the worse.
As Robert Sheer writes in Dear Leader Brings It On Truthdig.com 10/10/06 with reference to the North Korean alleged nuclear test:
Over the past six years, our "my way or the highway" president blew up a crucial nonproliferation agreement which was keeping North Korea’s plutonium stores under seal, ended bilateral talks with Pyongyang, squashed Japan’s and South Korea’s carefully constructed "sunshine policy," which was slowly drawing the bizarre Hermit Kingdom back into the light, and then took every opportunity to personally insult the country’s reportedly unstable dictator because it played well politically at home.
If you shun them, they will shape up — this was the essence of President Bush’s non-diplomacy, as it was in regards to Iran, Lebanon and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The result? Cold War-style brinkmanship that has left the United States helpless. (my emphasis)
Unfortunately, the fact that a military attack is neither a legal nor a practical option will not in itself be enough to restrain Cheney and Bush from trying it.
Iranian officials made clear Tuesday that international outrage at North Korea's declared test of a nuclear bomb would not deter them from moving ahead with their own nuclear program.
Indeed, the North Korean test comes as a relief to Iran because it takes the focus off its program — which Tehran says is aimed only at producing electricity, not weapons — and channels American ire toward Pyongyang, analysts said. They added that the international community's uncertainty about how to punish North Korea seems to have reinforced the Iranian government's belief that it has little to fear by proceeding with its program, vindicating its decision to resist international pressure to suspend it. ...
Tuesday, Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said Iran would insist on its right under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to develop the nuclear fuel cycle for civilian purposes.
"Our policy is clear … insisting on the nation's right without any retreat," state television quoted Khamenei as saying to a meeting of high-ranking government officials.
Two years ago, the Islamic Republic tried the path of negotiation, suspended its enrichment program and got nothing for it, Khamenei suggested. Now, he said, the program will proceed full bore.
"Two years ago [when] we started suspending uranium enrichment, if we didn't experience that path, we would have blamed ourselves for not testing that path," he said. "But today, we are going ahead with courage because no one can provide an acceptable reason why Iran's nuclear path is wrong." (my emphasis)
"The US extreme threat of a nuclear war and sanctions and pressure compel [North Korea] to conduct a nuclear test," the Foreign Ministry in Pyongyang warned last week.
That reasoning resonates in Tehran - even though comparisons are limited between North Korea and Iran, which is still a signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).
"More pressure [from the US] against Iran will accelerate the nuclear project of the country," says Saeed Laylaz, a political and security analyst in Tehran who says that American actions will determine Iran's strategic choices.
"Because the regime is convinced that the US wants to [change the regime], they believe they have a temporary opportunity to protect themselves [using] a nuclear program as a shield," says Mr. Laylaz. "If the US can convince [Iran] they are not going to collapse the regime ... then they will be ready to cooperate much better and more constructively than now." (my emphasis)
And if you're hardcore about following this, Anthony Cordesman has updated his Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs: A Strategic Assessment 10/10/06. If Iran is actually aiming for nuclear weapons capability, which virtually everyone seems to assume despite their official denials and their top religious leader Ayatollah Khamanei saying it would be wrong on religious grounds to seek nuclear weapons, possible motives listed by Cordesman include:
• National pride • Strategic posture in the region • The legacy of Iraq • Instability in the Gulf and the region • Deterrence to the US and US discussion of military action and regime change • Deterrence to Israel • Nuclear sandwich • Lessons from recent conflicts • The threat of Sunni Islamic extremism • The cause of Shiite Islamic extremism
