The ever-busy Anthony Cordesman has a new short paper (8 pages) out on Iraq's Sunni Insurgents: Looking Beyond Al Qa'ida (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]) 07/16/07 version. With the administration spokespeople now talking about the enemy in Iraq as though they are all "Al Qa'ida" being personally commanded by Osama Bin Laden, reality-based versions from knowledgable observers with actual integrity in their reporting are very welcome.
As an aside, can't somebody declare an official English spelling of "Al Qa'ida". For a long time, the more common American spelling was "Al Qaeda", while the normal British spelling was "Al Qaida". Just the last several months, I see more American instances of the "Al Qaida" version. German reports normally use "Al Qaida", too, although I've also seen "El Kaida" used as the German version. Juan Cole is currently using "el-Qaeda". I'm going to start using Cordesman's version, "Al Qa'ida", as long as we get to pick our favorite spelling.
It almost goes without saying that a reality-based version bears little resemblance to the Cheney-Bush version.
Cordesman describes the main guerrilla/insurgent groups in Iraq now, starting with the one the administration has been calling "Al Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI)".
He uses the name "Islamic State of Iraq or ISI-Al-Qa’ida":
ISI/Al-Qa’ida was known previously as the Mujahideen Shura Council; Al-Qa’ida Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers; and the Monotheism and Jihad Group; all three of which were led by Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, who was killed by Coalition forces in June 2006. Islamic State of Iraq was established in October 2006, in a likely attempt to gain local support for a group that has a large contingent of non-Iraqi fighters. Other insurgent groups tend to refer to ISI/Al-Qa’ida as al-Qa’ida in Iraq. The terms are used interchangeably.
The group was then led by Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, whom the Iraqi government claims to have killed on May 1, 2007. The group’s media outlet pledged to impose Islamic law on the areas in which it claimed authority. The group operates with a significant amount of independence from the larger network of al-Qa’ida. It is not clear that al-Qa’ida central leadership exerts control over ISI/Al-Qa’ida.
Their ideology is "hard-line jihadist-Salafist," including the perspective that jihad is a global struggle between believers and unbelievers. The group targets multinational forces, Iraqi forces, Shi'ite militias, and on occasion, Iraqi civilians. They operatedin al-Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah Al-Din, Ninewah, and areas of Babil and Wasit. (my emphasis)
He also lists and describes the other major groups in a similar way.
I'll list the other groups here with the names Cordesman uses and the spokespeople he gives. It strikes me that one of the administration's tactics has been to personalize their bogeyman version of AQI by associating a particular personality like Zarqawi with it, where this is not done so often with the other groups. Still, we should keep in mind Cordesman's caution, "There are still no reliable estimates of the strength of given groups, or of how many attacks of what kind a given group conducted, who their leadership is many cases, or exactly what they stand for." Here are the other groups he lists:
Mujahideen Army in Iraq. Spokesman: Sheikh Abd al-Rahman al-Qaysi
Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI). Spokesmen: Ibrahim al-Shammari, Ali al-Nu’aymi, and Imad Abdallah
Ansar Al-Sunnah Army (previously Ansar Al-Islam). Spokesman: Abu Abdallah al-Hasan Ibn Mahmud
Iraqi Resistance Movement – 1920 Revolution Brigades. Spokesman: Shaykh Abdullah Sulayman al-Umari
. The Islamic Front of Iraqi Resistance (JAMI). No spokesman given. Military wing is called the Salah Al-Din Al-Ayyubi Brigade.
There are other organizations named, as well, in his tables on insurgent public statements, like the Just Recompense Brigades (whose name probably loses something in translation) and the Shield of Islam.
Cordesman says that official estimates on the size of the groups are classified, then adds:
However, a background brief by US military experts in Iraq in early July 2007 stated that Al Qa’ida in Mesopotamia was responsible for only 15 percent of the attacks in Iraq in the first half of 2007. Other Sunni insurgents were blamed for 70 percent of attacks and Shi’a militias were blamed 15 percent. Shi’a attacks, however, had increased sharply and were estimated to be higher than 15 percent by the end of June.
Although Cordesman is a supporter of the Iraq War and advocates a long-term US presence there, he has been as critical as anyone I've seen of the dishonesty of official American reporting on the war under the Cheney-Bush administration.
The lack of reliable information in the public record, along with the secrecy and plain dishonesty of the Cheney-Bush claims in general, make definitive statements about the insurgency or any part of it hard. But he concludes his paper by expressing skepticism about the recent public claims by Gen. Kevin Bergner about the centrality of AQI in the Iraq War (which he quotes at length in this paper) by noting, "There are, however, many experts that feel such direction from "Al Qa'ida Center" is relatively limited, and that Al Qa’ida in Iraq operates largely on its own."
Cordesman reminds us that we also need to think carefully about the fact that there are various levels of "Al Qa'ida" affiliation (as well as the unreliability of much official reporting) in evaluating claims about AQI in Iraq:
Others [sic] experts indicate any efforts to make precise attributions of attacks by attacker were uncertain. Just as the US tended to say most suicide bombers were foreign, often without any forensic or other evidence, Al Qa'ida in Mesopotamia sometimes got the blame for attacks where the true source was uncertain. Moreover, unclassified reporting sometimes implied that assuming Al Qa'ida "franchises" like the ISI are under some form of serious central Al Qa'ida control. Al Qa’ida in Mesopotamia has a stronger Egyptian and Jordanian influence in its leadership than leaders linked to tied to Bin Laden and his group. Its membership is also now estimated to be about 95% Iraqi. (my emphasis)
This is his overall evaluation of the significance of AQI so far as he can judge from information currently available":
None of this means that the ISI-Al Qa'ida does not play a critical role in the insurgency. Al Qa'ida’s attacks do make an up a highly effective 15 percent and probably do the most damage in pushing Iraq towards civil war. The high visibility of these attacks and their relentless nature also do significant damage to the western public opinion, which sees the inability of coalition forces to stop these attacks as an indication that the war cannot be won. It does mean that ISI-Al Qa'ida’s activities must be kept in careful perspective, and that it does not dominate the Sunni insurgency. It is also clear from other Coalition and US statements that all of the insurgent groups can raise most of their own money and relies on arms left over from the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq.
The foreign volunteer issue also needs to be kept in perspective. Brigadier General Bergner, stated that ISI-Al Qa'ida was responsible for 80-90% of the suicide bombings in Iraq, many carried out by foreigners and that some 60-80 foreign fighters infiltrated into Iraq each month to join the organization. It is not clear how many suicide bombs involve foreigners, but the total number of bombings is minor compared to even the most conservative estimate of full and part time Sunni insurgents – some 15,000-25,000 – and foreigners have never dominated the number of detainees. (my emphasis)
We also need to keep in mind the caution made by Juan Cole and others that it may be to the perceived advantage of both Sunni insurgents and the Cheney-Bush administration to have "Al Qa'ida" be blamed for the more obviously sectarian bombing.
