Most of the Democrats in Congress and those running for President are clear that the United States has to get out of the Iraq War. Some have more substantial approaches to doing so than others. But they understand that there needs to be an exit strategy put in place ASAP.
But in the sad conventions that have developed in American politics, particularly since the Gulf War of 1991, the Democrats feel the need to show their "toughness" and "seriousness" by calling to escalate the Afghanistan War. I'm not assuming that the Democrats will win the White House in 2008, especially given the pitiful state of our national press. But it's enough of a possibility and close enough in time that I hope they will quickly come to understand that whatever political benefit they gain from getting the US out of the Iraq War, they could lose by failing to recognize that the Afghanistan War has long since become a lost cause, as well.
Col. Dennis Young in a paper published by the Army's Strategic Studies Institute, Overcoming the Obstacles to Establishing a Democratic State in Afghanistan (Oct 2007) gives a helpful recap of relevant Afghan history over the last couple of centuries. He describes vividly various problems facing the nation-building effort there, such as pervasive corruption, tribalism and lack of a tradition of a strong central government, and the role of opium production. But the most urgent question of American policy is this:
Additional security forces from the United States, NATO, and countries within ISAF are needed to secure Afghanistan and to create a safe environment for reconstruction efforts. To protect a large, populous country like Afghanistan that is fighting an active insurgency, a minimum of 100,000 troops are required, 250,000 at best. Currently, 35,000 troops are under ISAF command in Afghanistan, 22,000 of which are U.S. forces, far fewer than the number needed. ...
The nation-building process and peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan will last for decades.
That level of troop commitment just ain't gonna happen.
It strikes me as an incredibly optimistic assumption that even 250,000 of foreign troops from predominantly Christian countries can conduct a successful counterinsurgency (COIN) operation in Afghanistan at this stage. The former Soviet Union had some experience in a similar attempt a couple of decades ago. What Young writes about the needs of the civilian provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) also applies to the needs of COIN troops as well, "Familiarity with Afghan culture and languages, particularly Dari and Pashto, would be extremely helpful", those being the two predominant languages in Afghanistan.
Nearly 17 years after the Gulf War and nearly six years into the Iraq War, the Army still doesn't have ten of thousands of troops who are fluent in Arabic on highly familiar with the culture of any Arabic-speaking country. Will a Democratic President in 2009 be able to put 250,000 Dari- and Pasto-speaking troops on the ground in Afghanistan with a strong background in Afghan culture? Even the necons' fevered imaginations couldn't envision that.
Young is recommending making such a commitment. And he's trying to describe realistically, not in a nice propaganda package, what it would take to be successful in what he describes as the current NATO mission "of rebuilding Afghanistan as a functioning, liberal, pro-Western democracy".
But if you agree with Young's analysis of the needs, and if one of the essential elements is infeasible or something that you don't intend to do, then what is the sense of continuing the current mission? Is it right to send soldiers out to fight if you have every reason to believe there is no reasonable chance of success?
This is the choice the next President will have to face. Cheney and Bush have faced it already. They failed to eliminate the Al Qaida forces that were grouped in Afghanistan and failed to kill or capture Osama bin Laden. And they've decided to continue the Afghanistan War and hand it off to the next President, just like the Iraq War. They failed the country and they failed the soldiers.
The next President needs to drastically redefine the mission so that it can be accomplished without a huge number of foreign troops. And that mission should be part of an exit strategy for American troops. There was good reason to send American troops into Afghanistan in 2001. A protracted conflict there with American troops is not in the American interest.
Though that was the point on which I wanted to focus, there's a lot of interesting material in Young's paper. For example, I particularly enjoyed this definition of neoconservatism in a footnote:
Neoconservative philosophy can be defined as an aggressive and militaristic commitment to democracy, including a belief in the use of preventative war and regime changes. This ideology can be traced back to the U.S. stand against communism during the days of the Cold War. Today the term incorporates the belief that democracy is an antidote to the cause of terrorism, enmeshed in the political culture of the Middle East. (my emphasis)
Will we ever hear David Broder, Dean of All the Pundits, describes the Bush Doctrine or the neocons as "aggressive and militaristic"? As I've said before, the serious military publications very often have a far broader range of discussion and analysis than our punditocracy ever produces.
