But to judge by Bush's frequent remarks on national security, the most worrisome danger facing the United States lay not abroad but at home. As would be the case with Clinton, Bush professed to be mightily concerned that Americans after the Cold War would again succumb to the temptation to which he believed they were peculiarly susceptible: turning inward and ignoring the rest of the world.

No cause was more important than that of saving his fellow citizens from that error. Decrying the danger of isolationism became a frequent theme of the president's speeches. Bush denounced those who would "retreat into an isolationist cocoon." He railed against those "on the right and left who are working right now to breathe life into those old flat-earth theories of protectionism, of isolationism." He even resorted to unvarinished demagoguery. At ceremonies marking the fiftieth anniversary of Pearl Harbor, the president declared that "isolationism flew escort for the very bobmers that attacked our men 50 years ago," thereby finding the millions who before December 7, 1941, opposed U.S. entry into World War II guilty not simply of bad judgment but of treason. (my emphasis)

There were in fact few indications that the American people after the Cold War were inclined to "turn their backs on the world" - few, indeed, that they had ever done so throughout their history. But by reviving this shopworn refrain - and by portraying every foreign policy issue as a test of whether Americans would stay the course or shirk their duty to the world - [Old Man] Bush used isolationism as a calculated device for shoring up popular and congressional deference to the executive branch. Bill Clinton would do likewise. (my emphasis)

Few scholars specializing in American diplomatic history today accept such an outline of twentieth century U.S. foreign policy. But in practice, the myth of the "reluctant superpower" — Americans asserting themselves only under duress and then always for the noblest purposes — reigns today as the master narrative explaining (and justifying) the nation's exercise of global power.

To play a leading role in producing public goods [on the world stage], the United States will need to invest in both hard-power resources and the soft-power approach of leading by example. The latter will require more self-restraint on the part of Congress in international affairs as well as more robust action on domestic problems in such spheres as the economy, the environment and the criminal justice system. Providing public goods will also require an investment of resources in the non-military aspects of foreign affairs that Americans have been unwilling to make.

While polls show that American soft power has declined in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, they also show that the cause of the decline is government policies, not American culture and values. This is important because policies can change relatively quickly, while culture and values change more slowly. In the early 1970s, American policies in Vietnam led to low ratings in polls, but the country regained much of its soft power within a decade.

Faced with such a threat [as transnational terrorism], a certain degree of unilateral action, such as the war in Afghanistan, is justified if it produces global goods. After all, the British navy reduced the scourge of piracy well before international conventions were signed in the middle of the nineteenth century. But isolationism or extreme unilateralism are not promising options for the world's largest state.

Moreover, new problems like climate change and pandemics cross borders without the slightest regard to American culture or intentions. Turning inward does no good if the problems follow you home.

The United States’ role as a stabiliser and a bulwark against aggression by aspiring hegemons in key regions is generally seen as a public good by smaller states in those regions.

Promoting an open international economic system is good for American economic growth, and is good for other countries as well.

In addition, in the long term, economic growth is more likely to foster stable, democratic, middle-class societies in other countries, though the time scale will be far lengthier than it was recently fashionable to believe. To keep the system open, the United States must resist protectionism at home and support international economic institutions, such as the World Trade Organisation, the International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, that provide a framework of rules for the world economy.

The Middle East is the crucial current case in which American leadership is certainly required to establish lasting peace. It is true that there are some situations in which other countries can more effectively play the mediator’s role, and in other cases leadership can be shared, as with Europe in the Balkans. But often the United States is the only country that can bring parties together at relatively low cost, and when it is successful, such leadership increases American soft power at the same time that it reduces a source of instability.

If the assumptions hold, the United States will continue to be in a position to provide leadership in managing global security in all its dimensions. But it will have to learn to work with other countries to share such leadership.

• The US spends way too much money on the military. Currently, we spend half or more of the world's military spending. Our nearest competitor is China, which spends about 10% of what we do. That to me is insane on the face of it.

• Any American power that can be used for good purposes can also be used for bad ones. And we can't forget that there are bad people like Dick Cheney and Rummy can get into a position where they can misuse American power.

• An "Iraq syndrome" doesn't have to be a resurgence of "isolationism". On the contrary, a constructive evaluation of the limits of American power is critical. As Stanley Kutler says in Why George Bush Loves John McCain Truthdig.com 03/11/08:
  
  

  The more things change, the more they remain the same. The only thing we learn from the past is to forget it. But not so long ago, Vietnam taught us invaluable lessons. No, they were not about dominoes that never fell; it was that the United States had to understand and recognize the limits of power. An arrogant giant, knowing no boundaries, no restraint, could be defeated by Lilliputians. George W. Bush hardly gave the Vietnam War a thought 40 years ago, and surely he does not now. And sadly, neither does John McCain, who, with all that experience, should know better.