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Tuesday, March 04, 2008

A sign of the times

Now this is an eye-catching title for an article, Can the United States Iraq-ify the problem: Consider the Soviet Lessons in Afghanistan by Maj. Daniel Morgan Small Wars Journal 02/07/08. Maj. Morgan writes:

After six years of conflict with religious-inspired resistance, Soviet public support for Afghanistan waned, military leaders grew weary and cynical, and Afghan resistance increased in strength and willpower. Currently, public pressures for an Iraqi withdrawal are rising and if not carefully managed could result in a similar outcome like the Soviet efforts to "afghan-ize" the Afghan conflict. As US politics push to "Iraq-ify" the problem, leadership should note past withdrawals from counterinsurgencies to ensure a US withdrawal does not set preconditions for an Iraqi collapse and US failure. This paper analyzes Soviet-Afghan withdrawal negotiations and recommends that the US implement an internationally-monitored, regional “compromise and enforcement” negotiations strategy because any publicly announced timetable without provisos to modify or reverse the withdrawal will only accelerate the withdrawal itself and likely lead to civil war in Iraq and result in long term repercussions for US foreign policy. (my emphasis)

We always have to be on the lookout for stab-in-the-back arguments that blame the American public and Congressional war critics for losing the Iraq War. But when he writes that withdrawal "if not carefully managed" could lead to bad outcomes, he's got a point. I used to open all my posts on the Iraq War with a quotation from George McGovern and Jim McGovern, "Wars are easy to get into, but hard as hell to get out of." (Withdraw from Iraq Boston Globe 06/06/05).

What the two McGoverns wrote in 2005 still holds:

One thing, however, is clear: Washington cannot determine Iraq's destiny. It doesn't matter how many times Condoleezza Rice or Donald Rumsfeld visit. It doesn't matter how many soldiers we deploy. The myriad factions in Iraq themselves must display the political will to demand a system of government that respects the diversity that exists in their country.

There are no easy answers in Iraq. But we are convinced that the United States should now set a dramatically different course - one that anticipates US military withdrawal sooner rather than later. We should begin the discussions now as to how we can bring our troops home.

And despite the fact that war supporters like to claim that war opponents ignore the potentially bad aftermath of US withdrawal, the also wrote:

There are no guarantees that militarily withdrawing from Iraq would contribute to stability or would not result in chaos. On the other hand, we do know that under our occupation the violence will continue.We also know that our occupation is one of the chief reasons for hatred of the United States, not only in the Arab world but elsewhere.

Any hope of withdrawing with some reasonably good outcome - if there ever was such a hope - vanished long ago. We have only bad options in Iraq. But some, the Maverick McCain's 100 Years War plan comes to mind, are much worse than others.

Although I'm very much in favor of setting a near-term deadline for US withdrawal, Morgan does have some important observations about what we can learn from the Soviet disaster in Afghanistan that may have relevance to our Cheney-Bush-McCain disaster in Iraq. For instance:

Three years after the Soviet intervention in 1979, the Soviets demonstrated the foresight to commence with diplomatic negotiations for an exit strategy in the Afghan crisis. In 1982, with United Nations mediation, the primary actors – Pakistan, Afghanistan, Soviet Union, and US - settled on four points. First, the resolution demanded a politically independent and non-aligned Afghanistan. Second, the Soviets would withdraw all foreign combat troops. Third, Afghanistan would govern with the right of self determination and no outside interference. Lastly, the actors would set conditions for the return of over five million refugees, "in safety and honor." The Soviets and US saw these points as vital for conflict resolution and the regional balance of power. Unfortunately, the debate over a Soviet withdrawal timetable turned negotiations away from political solutions towards military ones that resulted in intensified violence throughout Afghanistan and ultimately a Soviet defeat. (my emphasis)

Unfortunately, much of Morgan's article is a polemic against setting a timetable for withdrawal. In his argument, Gorbachev's decision to set a deadline and get out underlined international negotiations on an orderly exit. Or, as he puts it with double emphasis, "the pronouncement of a timetable ultimately undermined the international legitimacy of the negotiations."

But he frames the story narrowly. Sure, if the Soviets had been willing and able to negotiate an exit in 1982, they probably could have come out of it with less damage to themselves and doing less harm to Afghan society. But, for whatever reason, Gorbachev in assessing the situation six years later in 1988 was dealing with a very different situation. They had clearly failed to suppress the rebellion, the US and Pakistan had no intention of ending supplies and other aid to the rebels, the Sunni recruitment network for foreign jihadis set up by the Saudis was still providing recruits for the holy war against the godless Communists, and he decided to cut his losses and get out.

The Soviet intervention went on for nine years, give or take. On March 19, McCain's war in Iraq enters year six. With no end in sight.

The Soviets never believed that the might Red Army that had turned back Hitler's Wehrmacht at the gates of Moscow and eventually turned back the German invasion, still the largest military invasion in human history, could be defeated in Afghanistan by a bunch of ~~scroungy Muslim terrorists~~ brave mujahideen freedom fighters. By the time the Soviets accepted reality and began their witdrawal, they were in no position to prevent a situation in which:

... a newly empowered Mujahideen seized key terrain for positional advantage and leverage upon the Soviet withdrawal which began to unravel the balance of power, worsened the refugee crisis and internally displaced persons crisis, and set conditions for civil war. ...

Consequently, the Soviet military found itself planning, organizing, and executing an accelerated withdrawal without flexibility and unable to meet key termination criteria developed in the negotiations.

But Morgan clearly buys into the stab-in-the-back notion of how dangerous and awful it would be for elected officials in the US to respond to the large majority opinion against the Iraq War:

... when Gorbachev announced in 1988 that the Soviet withdrawal would be complete within nine months and not be linked to stability of the Afghan government, he was attempting to mollify unfavorable Soviet public opinion toward the government because of an unpopular war. ...

Minimize US domestic politics during time of war and within the negotiations of any withdrawal strategy. Soviet politics affected the leadership decisions and the enemy exploited this opportunity. Currently, US frustration and upcoming elections are repeating Soviet-Afghanistan history in Iraq.

This is where the stab-in-the-back model can lead someone. Think about what the major is saying there. We're talking about the Soviet Union. You know, the godless Communist dictatorship, enemy of all civilization and business profits, the Evil Empire, and yadda, yadda.

He's stressing how important and effective public opinion was in the Soviet Union in pressuring their government to pull out of a disastrous war whose costs had long since come to exceed any possible benefits for the USSR. More effective than majority opinion has so far been in the United States, the City On The Hill, the Light Of Democracy To The World, in getting the US out of the Iraq War. Amazing.

Even more, he recommends emphatically, in the context of the whole article I would say it is his most emphatic point, that US leaders be more resistant to public opinion on the Iraq War than the leaders of the Soviet Union were in 1988 over their Afghanistan War. Wow. And, wow.

And that's only part of what he has to say on the subject:

US Congress continues to push for a public withdrawal timetable from Iraq, despite senior US military advice that it would empower the enemy and lead to civil war. Despite an admirable Soviet media plan, the Mujahideen exploited the publicly announced nine month timetable by gaining positional advantage against the Kabul government. Today, US Joint Chiefs of Staff estimates believe a precipitous withdrawal would be "under combat conditions." As the US heads into election debates and likely withdrawal negotiations, US leaders must remain cognizant of Soviet lessons from their withdrawal announcement. Below are some ideas for consideration:

1. Initiate another strong media embed program during the withdrawal phase to influence enemy forces and signatories to adhere to any "compromise and enforcement" agreements. The Soviets initially attempted this course, but their precipitous withdrawal undermined the negotiations and curtailed any media coverage of the withdrawal.

2. Develop a worldwide public relations campaign for the Iraqi government similar to the rebuilding of Kuwait following Desert Storm. The US should consider hiring public relations companies like Fleischmann-Hillard and others to build regional and international confidence in Iraq’s government and institutions. Of course, this plan requires a decision point where the Iraq Government is more effective in its governance and violence at a much lesser degree. (my emphasis)

Since Morgan's point is that American public opinion is the key perception problem for ~~the 100 Years War plan~~ his negotiations proposal, it's safe to assume that the "worldwide public relations campaign" would be primarily directed at American public opinion. I know this will sound as "quaint" as the notion of the Geneva Conventions does to Dick Cheney, but it is illegal for the US government to overtly propagandize the American public. Congress, the press and the general public need to be more aware of how much that law is evaded and probably much violated in practice.

In his conclusion, Morgan writes, "The current 'surge' strategy is the right path to victory. However, the enemy is time as well. History suggests that political capital will diminish and a withdrawal to some level is inevitable."

Yes, time is also the enemy. But to Morgan, it appears that time is only the enemy because it undermines support for the war among the US public. And that public opposition could eventually force Congress and the President to be as responsive to public opinion as the Soviet leaders were to their public in the Afghanistan War. Good grief! Do people who write stuff like this ever stop to think about how it sounds to an ordinary reader?

Behind that focus on US public opinion is an assumption of American invincibility. Whether the US stays or goes in Iraq, that view assumes it's entirely a matter of American domestic politics. But time is also an enemy because a protracted conflict itself in a war like this can be damaging to the US in a number of ways. And while a local population may be tolerant or friendly to a hostile occupying power under certain circumstances, in most cases the longer the occupier stays, the more hated they become. The longer we stay, the more narrow our options become. And that would be true even if a majority of the public thought McCain's 100 Years War strategy was just dandy.

By the way, although Morgan doesn't mention it, we and our NATO allies have our very own Afghanistan War going on. It's currently in year 6. Also with no end in sight.

Tags: daniel morgan, iraq war, stab-in-the-back

posted at 10:30:00 AM by Bruce Miller

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