Maverick McCain's "straight-talk" on the third anniversary of the invasion
I wonder if Maverick McCain slogan of "straight-talk" is intended to signal to Christian Right white guys that he ain't no gay sympathizer? Because a lot of his "straight-talk" on the Iraq War might as well have come straight out of Pentagon press releases.
[W]e must see this conflict through to the end. That means correcting our mistakes, building on our progress, and helping to plant in the most dangerous region in the world the seeds of democracy that will influence its neighbors. By doing so, we can begin to promote change in the oppressed societies that have bred the terrorists who threaten us. ...
That is the reality of the situation today. The challenge is not how to formulate a quick exit strategy, but rather to address the changes required to increase the odds of victory. From the beginning, coalition forces have lacked the requisite number of troops to stabilize the country, and so any plan for a partial withdrawal should be off the table for the near future. (my emphasis)
Yep, that's the bold Maverick's plan.
And he has some ideas about how to approach the war now, which he still seems to see as mainly a counterinsurgency war. (Pay no attention to all that civil war talk!)
Here's what our straight-talking Maverick suggests:
Ideally we would increase our forces in Iraq but, at a minimum, newly trained and equipped Iraqi troops should supplement, not substitute for, coalition forces.
These soldiers should be engaged in a military counterinsurgency strategy, combined with traditional security operations, rather than following their previous model: sweeping into cities to root out insurgents and then leaving to do the same elsewhere.
The Pentagon has made progress in moving toward such a strategy, but it will take much more time before it can effectively neutralize the insurgency. In addition, sectarian violence and the strength of militias can be reduced by ensuring that Iraqi National Army units and their counterparts in the Ministry of Interior are integrated by ethnicity and sect, and by increasing the diplomatic effort to urge a unity government in Iraq. (my emphasis)
The great Maverick was a bit more specific in the January 2006 print issue of Current History in an article called "Stay to Win", which presumably went to press in late November or early December.
There, he advocated a "clear and stay" counterinsurgency strategy, similar to that advocated by Andrew Krepinevich in How to Win in IraqForeign Affairs Sept/Oct 2005. Krepinevich recommended:
Instead, U.S. and Iraqi forces should adopt an "oil-spot strategy" in Iraq, which is essentially the opposite approach. Rather than focusing on killing insurgents, they should concentrate on providing security and opportunity to the Iraqi people, thereby denying insurgents the popular support they need. Since the U.S. and Iraqi armies cannot guarantee security to all of Iraq simultaneously, they should start by focusing on certain key areas and then, over time, broadening the effort - hence the image of an expanding oil spot. Such a strategy would have a good chance of success. But it would require a protracted commitment of U.S. resources, a willingness to risk more casualties in the short term, and an enduring [i.e., permanent] U.S. presence in Iraq, albeit at far lower force levels than are engaged at present. If U.S. policymakers and the American public are unwilling to make such a commitment, they should be prepared to scale down their goals in Iraq significantly. (my emphasis)
This "oil spot"/clear-and-hold/clear-and-stay strategy is an idea developed in the context of colonial wars against rural-based insurgencies. It's value in a large urban-guerrilla setting as in Iraq is certainly questionable.
But the Maverick in his Current History article gave an explicit example of how he sees his "clear and stay" approach working:
Coalition and Iraqi forces have done this successfully in Fallujah. They cleared the city of insurgents and held the city. Today Iraqi police and soldiers patrol the streets, with support from two US batallions. And when the Iraqi forces are at a level sufficient to take over the patrolling responsibilities on their own, American troops can hand over the duties. Fallujah today is not perfect, but the aim is not perfection — it is an improvement over the insecurity that plagues Iraq today. (my emphasis)
For a description of the "successful" operation in Fallujah that Maverick McCain takes as his model for all of Iraq, we go to Juan Cole at his Informed Comment blog of 03/17/06. Discussing the current Potemkin "Operation Swarmer" in the Samarra area, he talks about how the Fallujah operation that the Maverick so admires actually worked:
This Samarra operation is probably mainly a political act. The US generals are attempting to demonstrate to their Shiite allies that they take seriously the terror attack on the Askari Shrine on Feb. 22. Presumably they are also attempting to ensure that if the shrine is rebuilt, it won't just be blown up again. Short of pulling a Fallujah on Samarra, however - which would involve emptying the city and then destroying it - it is difficult to see how the US/ Iraqi government forces can prevail. Even then, they would just face sullen suicide bombers thereafter, as has happened in Fallujah, where 2/3s of the buildings were damaged and a large part of the population permanently dispossessed. (my emphasis)
Yep, that's our straight-talking Maverick's idea about how to win in Iraq.
It sounds kind of like the classic Vietnam War "we had to destroy the village in order to save it" approach, doesn't it?
Somebody tell me again, I keep needing to be reminded: just how is Maverick McCain a "moderate"?
