Once a process of fragmentation starts, Iraqis who have hitherto not felt strongly about their sectarian identity could be forced to do so. Such a trend is already apparent in parts of Baghdad where reports of sectarian violence are ominously commonplace. In June there were killings of Shi'a in Fallujah and Kurdish Iraqi army volunteers in Samarra. [Remember, this is 2004 they're writing about.]The lessons of Bosnia indicate that communities that have lived in relative harmony can embrace sectarian divisions overnight. In such a situation, it is certainly possible to envisage Iraq fragmenting into a Kurdish north, Sunni centre, and Shi’a south through default rather than design.

However, a neat split is highly improbable, particularly as many key cities, such as Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and Basra, are heterogeneous in their societal composition. Instead, the fragmentation would be violent and bloody. (my emphasis)

The Iraqi Shi'a may have tacitly accepted US involvement in Iraq as a temporary necessity to improve their position, but the traditional Shi'a leadership views US actions with deep mistrust. The populist Moqtada al-Sadr is openly hostile. Such acceptance as there is will only survive for as long as the US seems serious in promoting representative government in Iraq.

When the US turned its armed forces on Shi'a targets, including the Jaish al-Mahdi of Moqtada al-Sadr in the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala in spring 2004, at the same time re-empowering Sunni Arab ex-Republican Guard officers in Fallujah, the perception grew among the Shi'a that the US might want to find an Iraqi strongman in the mould of Saddam, rather than cede majority rule to the Shi'a. The Shi'a leadership has staked its political survival upon securing a predominant role for the community through elections. Any resistance to its demands, prompted by the United States ... would have to be met with public disobedience and heightened levels of hostility. (my emphasis)

Kurdish nationalism in Iraq is the leading example to Kurds region-wide. The centre of Shi'ism worldwide is Najaf in Iraq. Sunni Islamists outside Iraq can find common cause with jihadists within. The Turks have links to the Turkmen or at least claim some responsibility for their protection. The stand taken by the citizens of Fallujah against the Americans was an inspiration to anti-American nationalists across the Arab world. Meanwhile, both Kurds and Shi'a in Iraq have periodically served Iran as instruments for destabilization.

Over the past year [2003-2004], it has proved difficult to seal the borders of Iraq, even with the cooperation of neighbouring governments. Some of the tribes of southern Iraq are spread across Syria and into Saudi Arabia as well. The largest of these boast adherents of both Sunni and Shi'a Islam. When the toppling of Saddam's regime cleared the way for the Shi’a of Iraq to celebrate their religious festivals again, they were joined by fellow pilgrims from neighbouring countries and beyond. Normal economic life requires interchange with neighbouring countries. Iraq is thus a state penetrated by regional actors who have an impact upon the unfolding of its political transition. (my emphasis)

The Shi'a in Saudi Arabia have long been an underclass within a kingdom dominated by Wahhabism, a puritanical form of Sunnism. In many ways, the situation of the Shi’a in Saudi Arabia, albeit a minority, was quite similar to that of the Shi’a in Saddam's Iraq, with access to power heavily constrained, and with limited ability to exercise economic influence commensurate with their demographic weight. If Iraq is now entering a new phase of Shi'a control, the inspiration to the Shi’a in Saudi Arabia may be very powerful. For the Saudi government, their example is unwelcome, in part because the Shi'a constitute a majority in the oilrich Eastern Province of the country, and now enjoy unfettered linkage to the Shi’a power base in southern Iraq. Ayatollah Sistani's recent policy of mobilizing Shi’a tribes in southern Iraq must be viewed with great concern in Riyadh, as these tribes straddle the borders between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Arguably, the regionalization of the Iraq conflict has already happened to a significant degree. Particularly with regard to the transnational development of the Shi’a resurgence and Sunni reaction, the trends and dynamics are clear. The Kurds have, perhaps, not as yet emerged in a truly regional sense owing to their constrained position within Turkey, Iran and Syria, but if the Iraqi Kurds continue to consolidate their hold on the north of Iraq then political forces could be unleashed which will be almost impossible to control.

The Regional Remake scenario could overtake either of the other two considered here. If the Holding Together scenario produces a Shi'a dominated democracy with Kurdish autonomy, both Shi'a and Kurds will be emboldened elsewhere and some governments may seek to derail the experiment. If Iraq holds together only by perpetuating the position of the various militia in different parts of the country they could serve as a conduit for external interference. And if Iraq fragments, then the neighbours cannot but become involved. In any event, this would presage the potential unravelling of the [Iraqi] state system that has been in place since the 1920s, and the US intervention in Iraq would indeed have triggered a transformation of the region – albeit clearly not the one hoped for under the US democratization agenda.

Even sceptical Iranian nationalists would find the turn of events intoxicating. Not only was there an Iranian client in Herat, in Afghanistan, for the first time in 150 years [i.e., the idea that Kabul has effective control of Herat province is an idea the report didn't even take seriously enough to mention], but there were opportunities to make inroads in both the Shi'a heartlands of southern Iraq, and among the Kurds in the north. In the south in particular, Iranians were able to put their local knowledge, as well as their extensive experience of organizing out of chaos, to good use, providing social and welfare services the CPA was neither inclined nor able to provide. In the absence of countervailing factors, this pattern of expansion could continue, and with it the consternation of the United States. For a time at least it began to dawn on observers that the real long-term geopolitical winner of the 'War on Terror' could be Iran.

Fragmentation: On the whole the Iranian state will benefit from the fragmentation of Iraq for the simple reason that in geopolitical terms it will no longer have a viable rival on its Western border. If Iraq fragments into separate states which are internationally recognized, Iran’s influence in both cultural and economic terms is likely to increase. If fragmentation occurs but state stability is not achieved, Iran will benefit as long as the disputes which arise are contained. Should the state collapse, Iran will seek to influence and contain tensions but the risk that conflicts would spill over across the border would cause serious concern in Iran. ...

Regional Remake: If Iraq fragments it is increasingly likely that Iran will intervene both culturally and economically (both such interventions will of course have political aspects and ramifications). Iran will seek to protect its interests among both the Kurds and the Shi'a, supporting those groups which it feels will optimize its position. Iran will seek as far as possible not to become directly involved militarily, preferring to use proxies, but if other regional powers begin to intervene militarily, then it is possible that Iran will, albeit cautiously, relocate troops across the border – if for no other reason than to protect its borders and contain the flow of refugees.