The U.S. military ousting of Saddam Hussein appears to have benefitted Iran strategically. [Yes, it "appears" so!] ... The main thrust of Iran’s strategy in post-Saddam Iraq has been to persuade all Shiite Islamist factions in Iraq to work together to ensure political and electoral Shiite dominance of post-Saddam Iraq. However, Iran is increasingly close to powerful anti-U.S. Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, whose militia has been clashing with British peacekeeping forces in Basra since mid-2005 and conducted two major uprisings against U.S. forces in 2004. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said on March 7, 2006, that Iran had sent members of its Revolutionary Guard “Qods Force” (its export-of-the-revolution unit) into Iraq to assist militant forces, presumably those of Sadr. In May 2006, Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki visited Iraq, and the two countries pledged cooperation on securing their joint border. (my emphasis)

Since the fall of the Taliban, Iran has moved to restore some of its Iran’s traditional sway in western, central, and northern Afghanistan where Persian-speaking Afghans predominate. It aided Northern Alliance figures that were prominent in the post-Taliban governing coalition, and Iranian companies have been extensively involved in road building and other reconstruction projects in western Afghanistan. Since 2004, Iran’s influence has waned somewhat as its allies, mostly Persian-speaking Afghan minority factions still referred to as the “Northern Alliance,” have been marginalized in Afghan politics. However, a CRS visit to Afghanistan in March 2006 noted Iranian-funded Shiite theological seminaries being built in Kabul, perhaps an indication of Iran’s continuing efforts to support Afghanistan’s Shiite minority. Fearing the continuing presence of the about 18,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Iran has objected to the U.S. use of Shindand air base in western Afghanistan, asserting that it is being used to conduct surveillance on Iran. U.S. aircraft began using the base in September 2004 after the downfall of the pro-Iranian governor of Herat Province, Ismail Khan.

Iran long opposed the regime of the Taliban in Afghanistan on the grounds that it oppressed Shiite Muslim and other Persian-speaking minorities. Iran nearly launched a military attack against the Taliban in September 1998 after Taliban fighters captured and killed nine Iranian diplomats based in northern Afghanistan, and Iran provided military aid to the Northern Alliance factions. Iran, along with the United States, Russia, and the countries bordering Afghanistan, attended U.N.-sponsored meetings in New York (the Six Plus Two group) to try to end the conflict in Afghanistan. During the major combat phase of the post-September 11 U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, Iran offered search and rescue of any downed service-persons and the trans-shipment to Afghanistan of humanitarian assistance. In March 2002, Iran expelled Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a pro-Taliban Afghan faction leader. Iran froze Hikmatyar’s assets in Iran (January 2005). (my emphasis)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), despite intensified inspections and other means of investigation since late 2002, has been unable to verify that Iran’s program is purely peaceful. Its reports on January 31, 2006, and February 27, 2006, say documents found by the IAEA show a possible “military nuclear dimension” to Iran’s program, including plans for high explosives and warheads. ...

Despite Iran’s professions that WMD is inconsistent with its ideology, virtually all Iranian factions appear to agree on the utility of WMD, particularly the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. Iran might see a nuclear weapon as a means of ending its perceived historic vulnerability to U.S. domination and a symbol of Iran as a major nation. Other experts see it as an instrument to dominate the Persian Gulf and believe an Iranian nuclear weapon would dramatically shift the balance of power in the Gulf/Middle East in Iran’s favor. There are also fears Iran might transfer WMD to extremist groups or countries, and Supreme Leader Khamene’i heightened those concerns in April 2006 by saying that Iran might transfer nuclear technology to Sudan or other countries.

Although suspicions of Iran’s intentions are widely shared, there is disagreement over the urgency of the issue. In testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 16, 2005, DIA head Adm. Jacoby (see above) said that, “Unless constrained by a nuclear non-proliferation agreement, Tehran probably will have the ability to produce nuclear weapons early in the next decade.” In August 2005, press reports about an intelligence community estimate said the U.S. estimate of an Iranian nuclear weapons ranges from 6-10 years from then. In his February 2, 2006, threat briefing to the Senate Intelligence Committee, Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte said that Iran probably does not have a nuclear weapon or “produced or acquired the necessary fissile material” for one. Other experts focus on a so-called “point of no return,” a point at which Iran has the expertise needed for a nuclear weapon, a point that could be reached within a year by some estimates. Negroponte and other intelligence officials indicated that Iran’s April 11, 2006, announcement that it had enriched uranium (low enrichment, 3.5%) did not materially change their estimates of how close Iran might be to a nuclear weapons capability. Iran subsequently claimed it had mastered a 164-centrifuge cascade, although press reports say that is in doubt and that Iran might have slowed its program in May 2006. However, some were alarmed at Ahmadinejad’s revelation that Iran has been conducting “research” with advanced (P-2) centrifuges. (my emphasis)

The Paris Agreement broke down just after the June 2005 Iranian presidential election. Iran rejected as insufficient the EU-3 “final settlement” plan (August 5, 2005) that offered to assist Iran with peaceful uses of nuclear energy (medicine, agriculture, and other civilian uses) and provide limited security guarantees in exchange for Iran’s (1) permanently ending uranium enrichment; (2) dismantling its heavy water reactor at Arak; (3) agreement to nonotice nuclear inspections; and (4) pledge not to leave the NPT (which has a legal exit clause). On August 8, 2005, Iran broke the IAEA seals on its uranium “conversion” (one step before enrichment) facility at Esfahan and began conversion.

On September 24, 2005, a majority of the IAEA Board voted to declare Iran in non-compliance with the NPT and to refer the issue to the Security Council if Iran did not come back into compliance with the Paris Agreement.18 No time frame was set for the referral. Iran headed off immediate action by allowing new IAEA inspections of the military-related Parchin plant and by providing new information on a 1987 offer by the A.Q. Khan network for advanced centrifuge designs. Iran did not cease uranium conversion (and the IAEA said on April 28, 2006, that Iran has about 110 tons of converted uranium, enough for 10 nuclear weapons if enriched), although the conversion facility remained under IAEA inspection. Continuing to back diplomacy, the Administration supported a mid-November 2005 Russian proposal to Iran to establish a facility in Russia at which Iranian uranium would be enriched, thereby enabling Iran to claim it had retained its right to enrich. Iran did not accept the proposal, but it has not rejected the idea outright.

The United States tilted markedly toward Iraq in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, including U.S. diplomatic attempts to block conventional arms sales to Iran, providing battlefield intelligence to Iraq and, during 1987-88, direct skirmishes with Iranian naval elements in the course of U.S. efforts to protect international oil shipments in the Gulf from Iranian attacks. In one battle on April 18, 1988, Iran lost about a quarter of its larger naval ships in a one-day engagement with the U.S. Navy, including one frigate sunk and another badly damaged. (my emphasis)

As concerns over Iran’s nuclear program have grown, public discussion of a military option against Iran’s nuclear facilities has increased. President Bush has maintained that “all options are on the table.” Administration officials and others cite a statement by Senator McCain at a conference in Germany in early February 2006, in which he said that military action would be preferable to a nuclear Iran. All-out U.S. military action to remove Iran’s regime does not appear to be under serious consideration within the Administration. Most experts believe U.S. forces are spread too thin, including about 133,000 deployed in Iraq, to undertake such action, and that U.S. forces would be greeted with hostility by most Iranians. U.S. allies in Europe, not to mention Russia, China, and others, have expressed strong opposition to military action, at least while diplomatic options remain active.

Some experts believe that limited military action, such as air or missile strikes against suspected nuclear sites should be considered. Most experts believe the United States could carry out such strikes with cruise missiles and combat aircraft and bombers from bases in or within range of the Gulf and from aircraft carriers. ...

Experts differ on the effectiveness of striking Iran’s nuclear facilities. Some argue that doing so could set back Iran’s nuclear program because many of the relevant targets are known and could be struck, even those that are hardened or buried. Some advocates say that there are only a limited number of key nuclear sites and that striking them would cripple Iran’s program. One former Air Force planner estimates that up to 400 targets would need to be struck, including at least that would require penetrating munitions. Opponents of a strike question whether the United States is aware of or militarily able to reach all relevant sites and argue that Iran might retaliate through terrorism or other means, such as shutting down its own oil exports. Supreme Leader Khamene'i threatened military retaliation in a speech on April 26, 2006. Some believe that a U.S. strike would cause the Iranian public to rally around Iran’s regime, setting back U.S. efforts to promote change within Iran. Still others, such as authors of a recent National Defense University study, believe that a nuclear weapons capability would not embolden Iran’s foreign policy because U.S. conventional capabilities and regional alliances could blunt any Iranian aggressiveness. Others believe the United States could reduce Iran's potential for military or unconventional retaliation by striking not only nuclear facilities but also Iran’s conventional military infrastructure, particularly the small ships and coastal missiles Iran has in and around the Strait of Hormuz. (my emphasis)

A decision to take military action might raise the question of presidential authorities and congressional consultation. H.Con.Res. 391, introduced by Representative Peter DeFazio on April 26, 2006, calls on the President to not initiate military action against Iran without first obtaining authorization from Congress.