Threatening Iran

The Cheney-Bush administration (who was dead wrong about Iraq's WMDs) is telling the International Atomic Energy Commisssion (who was right about Iraq's WMDs) that the US knows about Iran's WMD programs. Apparently, the Cheney-Bush team want us to believe that Iran is on the verge of being able to crank out enough weapons-grade uranium for 40 nuclear bombs: U.S. to IAEA: Iran is determined to produce nuclear weapons Ha'aretz 09/13/06

The United States ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency Gregory Schulte, on Wednesday released a statement saying Washington is convinced that Iran is determined to acquire the technology, materials and know-how necessary for the production of nuclear arms. ...

Among other things, the U.S. ambassador says that Iran has assembled an additional 164 centrifuges at its Nantz plant, thus doubling their number; it prevents IAEA inspectors from receiving the documentation on centrifuge activation; and IAEA inspection monitoring records were confiscated and destroyed.

From [David] Albright: 'Room for Optimism' in Confrontation with Iran Council on Foreign Relations 09/12/06:

[H]ow far along is Iran in its own nuclear development?

That’s another bright spot and I think that's one of the things that opens up this idea of pre-negotiations. Last April when I talked to people in the IAEA with knowledge of the program in Iran and people in the United States there was an expectation that by the end of this summer Iran could very well have five or six cascades [a connected series of machines crucial to enrichment] operating. A cascade would be 164 centrifuges connected together by pipes, but in fact they only have one operational. They didn’t finish the second and third. The first one, which is operational, we estimated from the IAEA safeguards report only operated about 10% of what it could have. They barely have any enrichment going on. You don’t have Iran expanding the pilot plant as was expected last spring and so again you almost have something close to de facto suspension.

So I think Iran isn’t doing much enrichment and therefore for it to suspend enrichment for a few months is not that big of a step. And since there isn’t much enrichment going on I think the Europeans decided that could start a pre-negotiation process with Iran.

How many cascades are necessary to produce enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb?

Iran would want about ten to fifteen cascades operating to be able to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a bomb a year. There are a lot of factors in play, but it needs to go considerably further before it has a plant big enough. And the pilot plant may not be the best place to do it. It was designed to hold six cascades that could operate in parallel or simultaneously. That’s what you have to do in a centrifuge plant. It’s not enough to operate one, you have to operate many and they have to operate with common systems. So the pilot plant really isn't set up to be a production plant. It is certainly not designed to make highly enriched uranium. You could do it, but it would very inefficient. (my emphasis)

Notice how different the numbers sound; in the US letter, another 164 centrifuges!! Material for 40 nuclear bombs!!! Centrifuges and heavy water and bombs, oh my!


In Albright's interview 164 centrifuges = 1 cascade. You need a minimum of ten cascades to grind out enough weapons-grade uranium to for one bomb per year. Iran currently has one, according to Albright in his 09/12 interview. Schulte's letter claims that has been doubled to 2 cascades.

Gary Sick reported a couple of weeks ago (Gary Sick on Republican Hype on Iran No Quarter blog 08/27/06) in a brief piece discussing the Republican propadanda report released under the aegis of the House Intelligence Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy:

If you are going to take on the entire US intelligence community, it is a very good idea to at least get your basic facts straight. On a very quick reading, I found a statement on p. 9 claiming that the 164 centrifuges at the Iranian Natanz site are "currently enriching uranium to weapons grade." There is no evidence whatsoever that this is true - and a lot of evidence that the tiny bit of enriched uranium produced at this site was reactor grade (c. 2.5%? vs weapons grade c. 95%?). It may be true that [staffer and neocon true believer Frederick] Fleitz [who contributed significantly to the report according to Sick], and perhaps many in the neo-con community, suspect that weapons grade enrichment is either covertly underway or is planned, but their suspicions should not be allowed to substitute for facts.

Throughout the report, there is careful documentation of any & all criticism that the IAEA inspectors have produced or any questions that they may have raised about Iran's performance. However, there is no mention at all of any of the IAEA conclusions that they find no evidence of weapons production or activity. Some people will recall that the IAEA inspectors, in their caution, were closer to the truth about Iraqi WMD than, say, the Vice President's office. (my emphasis)

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