Five Years After 9/11: The tragic situation of the Cheney-Bush response
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has prepared an updated look at the state of the fight against terrorism in Five Years After 9/11, Julianne Smith and Thomas Sanderson, eds. 09/07/06
The first essay in the book by Daniel Benjamin and Qidan Kirby, "The Evolving Threat of Terrorism", concludes:
The United States has been fortunate not to have been struck again since 9/11, and a number of reasons can be adduced for this. The American Muslim community has thus far been largely immune to the jihadist virus. It is more difficult for radicals from abroad to gain entry to the country. Al Qaeda is on the one hand not as capable and on the other hand determined that its next attack will top its last one in drama and impact. And, of course, it is easier for jihadists to kill Americans in Iraq than it is in the United States, and those casualties provide the radicals with the proof they need to show the global community of Muslims of their devotion to their cause. Over the long term, however, the terrorists will inevitably seek to rebuild their networks and capabilities to attack the United States at home. This is the gold standard for them, and if the overall strength of the movement is growing, reestablishing the capacity to carry off "spectaculars" will be on their agenda. (my emphasis)
Benjamin and Kirby argue that most of the notable successes we've scored so far against terrorism since 9/11 "have been fundamentally tactical in nature and that the overall picture is one of worrisome strategic slippage." They point out that some of the successes have been very significant, like the captures of Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the two of whom they call "perhaps the most innovative and dangerous terrorist planners in history".
Despite their intimate involvement in the 9/11 attacks, though, the torture to which those two were subjected in captivity makes it much less likely that they could be convicted in any court with a half-fire legal process. Both are now presumably in the Guantanamo branch of the Bush Gulag.
Benjamin and Kirby also write:
The single major exception in the plus column came very early in the conflict: the toppling of the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan, which robbed al Qaeda of the sanctuary it had enjoyed since the mid-1990s. During the time it was headquartered in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden’s organization managed through its financial largesse and loans of fighters to the Taliban to turn its host into the first terrorist-sponsored state. Al Qaeda was able to expand and strengthen its network and conspire against the United States and the West with relative impunity. Among the results, of course, were the destruction of two U.S. embassies in Eastern Africa, the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, and the 9/11 attacks.
The invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 culminated in al Qaeda’s loss of its operational base. Consequently, the ability of bin Laden and his deputies to manage their network and direct attacks has been significantly degraded.
They go on to discuss the short-comings of the initial campaign in Afghanistan - Bin Laden got away along with many of his most experienced cadre who could have been killed or captured in the Battle of Tora Bora.
They write:
The U.S. failure to consolidate security in both Afghanistan and Iraq has since severely undermined the nation’s early record of success. A resurgent Taliban represents an enduring threat to stability in Afghanistan, and perhaps the most damaging development is that Iraq has become the central battlefield of jihad. The number of foreign fighters in the country is disputed, but studies show that the insurgency against the U.S. occupation is drawing young men with no background in radical activities to Iraq. Even more ominously, an Iraqi jihadist movement has emerged where none existed before. Two of the major insurgent groups, the Islamic Army of Iraq and Ansar al-Sunna, embrace a radical ideology; al-Zarqawi’s al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers claims to have all-Iraqi units. (my emphasis)
And they note that the lack of progress in the ideological conflict with the extremist Salafi groups that promote the jihadist ideology is a severe problem:
It is not obvious now how many Iraqi jihadists will support the global jihad of bin Laden and how many will focus their efforts on Iraq’s fledgling state. Even if relatively small numbers opt for the global fight, though, it could make a significant difference to the terrorists’ capabilities, as has been seen by the actions of the small numbers of individuals involved in the Madrid and London bombings.
The chief reason for the spread of the jihadist ideology is the failure to deal effectively with the ideological component of Islamist radicalism. Although administration leaders have often spoken of the terrorists’ ideology of hatred, our actions have too often lent inadvertent confirmation to the terrorists’ narrative. ...
It is clear that Iraq provided a major part of the motivation for the Madrid and London bombers and for Mohammed Bouyeri, the murderer of Theo van Gogh. In countries such as Pakistan, it is also clear that anti-Americanism has been bolstered by the invasion of Iraq, and it is increasingly being used as a tool of mobilization for radicals. (my emphasis)
The Cheney-Bush master narrative, though, claims that American actions have nothing at all to do with the jihadists'. They hate us for our freedoms, the line goes. And their hatred is fanatical, irrational and answerable only with violence and torture.
This is a strange and unfortunate concept that makes a sensible debate about costs and benefits even more difficult. For instance, if the United States attacks Iran, one of the very likely consequences would be increased terrorist attacks against American targets. European Union officials don't seem to think it evidences an embarrasing lack of testosterone to discuss that publicly. After all, it makes perfect sense to prepare for likely consequences.
The Republican attitude on this is just weird. Leaving aside for the moment the vacuity of the neocons' excuses for attacking Iran, the sensible approach in that event would be to say, okay, we've decided we're going to attack Iran. Now we have to do all the appropriate things to prepare for likely consequences, included warning the American people and law-enforcement that more terrorists attacks against Americans are likely to follow. If going to war with Iran were in our national interests, then that would be one of the consequences with which we would have to deal to defend our countries interests.
What sense does it make really to pretend that American policies have no affect on the recruitment and motivation of terrorist attacks?
Eric Alterman, whose "Altercation" blog is moving from MSNBC to Media Matters in a week, writes in a 09/11/06 reflection on the last five years about the ways in which the Cheney-Bush administration have used 9/11 to do so many things that have been incredibly damaging to the United States: 9/11: America attacked twice.
I look back on that moment when so many of us wanted to trust our president and I wonder:
Who would have imagined in their worst nightmares that these political usurpers would employ the human catastrophe of 9/11 to continue the terrorists work for them? Who would have imagined that they would embark on a course that would eventually kill more Americans than died on 9/11 in wars that do nothing to ensure the nation’s security but much to inspire more Arabs to hate us and wish to attack us? Who would have imagined they would dissipate the global solidarity and support the world had offered us? ... Who would have imagined they would lie to the rescue workers about the health effects of the air they were breathing. Who would have imagined that they would put the fate of the nation in the hands of a group of lying, conniving, rats like “curveball,” Ahmad Chalabi and the INC? ... Who would have imagined they would emulate our enemies, employing methods of torture and massacre? ... Who would have imagined they would use the attacks to create a domestic spying regime, a series of secret prisons and tribunals, and the declare the right to abrogate any and all American civil liberties whenever it struck their fancy? Who would have imagined, in other words, that they would exploit these tragic deaths to seek to undermine our Constitution, our Bill of Rights, indeed the very foundations of the same "freedom" that allegedly inspired the terrorists in the first place? And finally, who would have imagined that our vaunted "liberal media" and nonpartisan political establishment would cheer them along the way, failing to ask the difficult questions and attacking the patriotism and even sanity of those with the courage and foresight to do so?
9/11 could have been a rebirth of our nation’s civic and political culture, together with a recommitment to use our power to ensure the security and prosperity of a world community that looked to us with sympathy and admiration. “We are All Americans,” said Le Monde. Today most of the world is anti-American and understandably so. We have failed the Afghans. We have failed the Iraqis. We have failed our long-time allies, indeed, virtually everyone who trusted us. We will survive, of course, and someday, a more enlightened leadership will be able to undo some of the damage these two curses have inflicted upon us and return us to the values that helped build this great nation. But the opportunity offered by a world united in solidarity with America and its values is almost certainly dead for good. Let the coroner’s certificate read: “Cause of Death: Lies, Extremism, Incompetence, Corruption, Murder, Torture, and Hypocrisy, Stupidity, and Even More Lies.” (my emphasis)
Harsh thoughts. But he's describing a harsh reality.
Tom Engelhardt asks a worthwhile what-if question that gets at the issue of how much we the public have allowed ourselves to be dominated by fear in response to the 9/11 attacks: 9/11 in a Movie-Made World TomDispatch.com 09/07/06.
Political articles based on "popular culture" themes usually make me very wary. Because often they're little more than someone promoting their particular take on things dressed up with references to movies or TV packaged as evidence of a larger trend.
But what Engelhardt is doing in this piece is to look at how Al Qaida staged the 9/11 attacks, using images of mass destruction familiar from popular culture. His what-if question is this:
So here was my what-if thought. What if the two hijacked planes, American Flight 11 and United 175, had plunged into those north and south towers at 8:46 and 9:03, killing all aboard, causing extensive damage and significant death tolls, but neither tower had come down? What if, as a Tribune columnist called it, photogenic "scenes of apocalypse" had not been produced? What if, despite two gaping holes and the smoke and flames pouring out of the towers, the imagery had been closer to that of 1993? What if there had been no giant cloud of destruction capable of bringing to mind the look of "the day after," no images of crumbling towers worthy of [the movie] Independence Day?
We would surely have had blazing headlines, but would they have commonly had "war" or "infamy" in them, as if we had been attacked by another state? Would the last superpower have gone from "invincible" to "vulnerable" in a split second? Would our newspapers instantly have been writing "before" and "after" editorials, or insisting that this moment was the ultimate "test" of George W. Bush's until-then languishing presidency? Would we instantaneously have been considering taking what CIA Director George Tenet would soon call "the shackles" off our intelligence agencies and the military? Would we have been reconsidering, as Florida's Democratic Senator Bob Graham suggested that first day, rescinding the Congressional ban on the assassination of foreign officials and heads of state? Would a Washington Post journalist have been trying within hours to name the kind of "war" we were in? (He provisionally labeled it "the Gray War.") Would New York Times columnist Tom Friedman on the third day have had us deep into "World War III"? Would the Times have been headlining and quoting Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz on its front page on September 14, insisting that "it's not simply a matter of capturing people and holding them accountable, but removing the sanctuaries, removing the support systems, ending states who sponsor terrorism." (The Times editorial writers certainly noticed that ominous "s" on "states" and wrote the next day: "but we trust [Wolfowitz] does not have in mind invading Iraq, Iran, Syria and Sudan as well as Afghanistan.")
Would state-to-state "war" and "acts of terror" have been so quickly conjoined in the media as a "war on terror" and would that phrase have made it, in just over a week, into a major presidential address? Could the Los Angeles Daily News have produced the following four-day series of screaming headlines, beating even the President to the punch: Terror/Horror!/"This Is War"/War on Terror?
In the end, more damage to American interests and security has been done by bad policies of the Cheney-Bush administration than by the direct effects of the 9/11 attacks. Also a harsh though, but also describing a harsh reality. And it largely happened because Congress, the Democratic Party, the mainstream media and the public generally allowed the politics of fear so cynically practiced by the Cheney-Bush team to dominate the agenda of the "global war on terrorism".
The response to the attacks could have been to build on the unprecedented sympathy and good will of the rest of the world with really constructive measures that could have transformed international politics for the better. Instead, five years out, we have headlines like these: