As I say, people want to know, can you win? They're with us if we can win. If we're there and can't win, we're gone. If we can't win, I'll pull us out. If I didn't think it was noble and just and we can win, we're gone. I can't – I'm not going to keep those kids in there and have to deal with their loved ones. I cannot – I can't cover it up when I meet with a family who's lost a child. I cry, I weep, I hug. And I've got to be able to look them in the eye and say, we're going to win. I have to be able to do that. And I'm not a good faker. ...

A thousand of the enemy killed, or whatever the number was. It's happening; you just don't know it. And there's no scorecard. There's not a scoreboard that makes it – great, four more schools – that doesn't score, that doesn't mean anything. [Is there somewhere behind this an unstated awareness that the casualty rates, including civilians, from the heavy bombing still going on in Iraq is much greater than the American press reports?]

You know, Larry, I've thought long and hard about this, because it is precisely what is frustrating most people. Most people out there – I agree with you – those who say we shouldn't have been there, they're clear. A lot of people – one time I – well, a lot of people are just saying, you're not doing enough to win. We're not winning, you're not doing enough to win, and I'm frustrated, I want it over with, with victory. And I'm trying to figure out a matrix that says things are getting better. I think that one way to measure is less violence than before, I guess. We'll have to see what happens here after Ramadan. I believe these people – oh, I was going to tell you [Gen.]Abizaid believes Ramadan, no question, caused them to be more violent because he says there's some kind of reward during Ramadan for violence. [?!?] And I think they're trying to affect the elections.

Hold on, Michael. But I'm – look, I understand completely where you both are coming from. You don't have to tell me people are out there looking for something. I'm from Texas. My buddies are saying, are you doing enough, not, are you doing too little. They want to know, are we winning. They want to know, this mighty country, are we putting it – are we doing what it takes to win? That's my question to General Casey.

The frustration is that the definition of success has now gotten to be, how many innocent people are dying? And if there's a lot dying, it means the enemy is winning. That doesn't mean they're winning. It means they're – the question is really, how tough are the Iraqis? And it seems like to me they're unbelievably resilient. And I think – say they are because they want to succeed.

But I'll think about it. I'll run it back up the flag pole. (Laughter. ) (my emphasis)

The first question that you must ask a President – you can put this any way you
want – I'm not asking myself questions, but you should be asking me – is, do you trust Maliki? Is he the right guy to show the courage necessary
to achieve the objective? And the answer is, I think he is. Witness the
fact that he is working hard to bring Shia and Sunni clerics together, working
hard to bring the political parties together; understands that he's going to
have to deal with these militias; more than willing to work to bring these death
squad leaders to justice, which we're doing now.

Today, at the press conference, they asked about, well, he got concerned that we were making decisions in certain neighborhoods. Look, our agreement with him is, we'll keep you posted. We didn't keep him posted. But he understands that he's going to have to – we're going to have to go after these guys. This is a sovereign government. This was elected by the people. As fragile as it is, it is a government of the Iraqi people, which we've got to honor. ...

I think it's going – see, that's what this benchmark deal is all about. There's
one way, Kudlow – forgot to – I should have thought of that. The idea is to develop with the Iraqi government a series of benchmarks – oil, federalism, constitutional reform – there's like 20 different things – and have that developed in a way that they're comfortable with and we're comfortable with.

They were asking me today, put out benchmarks. Well, it's a sovereign
government. You just don't put out benchmarks. You work with the sovereign
government to develop a way forward that's got enough pressure on them to move,
but at the same time, they're comfortable with. Look, if we wanted to,
we could put so much pressure on the Maliki government to topple it
What good would that do? We could put so many demands on them, it might satisfy
people in the short-term, but it would defeat the purpose for victory in Iraq. ...

And old Zal is a great ambassador because he's patient in the sense that he understands there this dance that they go through. [He means Zalmar Khalilzad, US ambassador to Iraq.] But I believe they're getting more crisp in their decision-making. That's one of the interesting things about Maliki, he appears to be a decision-maker. He doesn't like it when he's pushed too hard. You see blowbacks occasionally. Today he didn't like it when there was an action taking place in the Sadr City. He didn't like it because it caught him by surprise. Presidents don't like surprises. But he appears to be a crisper decision-maker and a follow-through guy. That's the whole purpose of the benchmarks, is to have – okay, you said, you're going to do this now, let's start getting some decisions made. So, precisely, you picked up the whole purpose of it. (my emphasis)

And the security process is – the fundamental question is, is General Casey right in achieving the balance between independent operations by the Iraqi army and our need to be there? And this is an art, not a science. It is, at what point do you let them go? And I trust his judgment. His judgment is a lot more refined than anybody else's that I hear from, because he's there, he's living this issue, he wants to succeed. He is constantly adjusting our game plan. This stuff about "stay the course" – stay the course means, we're going to win. Stay the course does not mean that we're not going to constantly change.

Classic example: I told them in the press conference today, last spring I thought we were going to be able to say to the American people, we'll have a lot fewer troops in Iraq. You know why I thought that? Because that's what General Casey thought. He felt like the situation was progressing to the point where he was going to be able to let them go, to a much greater extent – let them go defend themselves to a much greater extent than turned out to be, because of this al Qaeda-inspired sectarian violence. And so he says, look, this thing isn't going to – we need more troops, not less. And so what happens is, is that I say, okay, whatever you need. You want more troops, you've got more troops. You want less troops, we'll have less troops, but please give me the rationale why.

What's happening is I'm not – remember the pictures in the Oval Office, with them sitting over the maps, picking out the targets in Vietnam? That's not happening in this war. The Commander-in-Chief, through the Secretary of Defense, must empower the military people on the ground, and the embassy, to work – and by the way, these guys are working very closely, which is important – to implement the strategy. And if tactics need to change, change them. Just keep us posted. And that's what's happening.

Abizaid, who I think is one of the really great thinkers, John Abizaid – I don't know if you've ever had a chance to talk to him, he's a smart guy – he came up with this construct: If we leave, they will follow us here. That's really different from other wars we've been in. If we leave, okay, so they suffer in other parts of the world, used to be the old mantra. This one is different. This war is, if they leave, they're coming after us. As a matter of fact, they'll be more emboldened to come after us. They will be able to find more recruits to come after us.

Abizaid clearly sees this struggle – he sees the effects of victory in Iraq as having a major impact on other parts of the Middle East. He also sees the reciprocal of that, a defeat – just leaving – the only defeat is leaving, is letting things fall into chaos and letting al Qaeda have a safe haven. And he sees it as a – he sees that as an accelerating effect to creating incredible hostility toward people that are moderate in their view. They may not necessarily be as democrat [sic] as they want, but they're moderate in their view about the future. (my emphasis)