Operation Swarmer: postmodern war, Pentagon/Republican Party style
Remember that big ole "air assault", Operation Swarmer, I posted about yesterday?
It turns out it's like a lot of things in the Bush administration: as meaningful as a mirage in the desert.
Reporter Chris Albritton writes in his Back to Iraq blog today that it is more like Operation Overblown:
But according to a colleague of mine from TIME who traveled up there [the Samarra area, target of the operation] today on a U.S. embassy-sponsored trip, there are no insurgents, no fighting and 17 of the 41 prisoners taken have already been released after just one day. The "number of weapons caches" equals six, which isn’t unusual when you travel around Iraq. They're literally everywhere. ...
As noted, about 1,500 troops were involved, 700 American and 800 Iraqi. But get this: in the area they’re scouring there are only about 1,500 residents. According to my colleague and other reporters who were there, not a single shot has been fired. (my emphasis)
And he notes that there is "so far no evidence of bombardment of any kind".
He continues:
"Operation Swarmer" is really a media show. It was designed to show off the new Iraqi Army — although there was no enemy for them to fight. Every American official I've heard has emphasized the role of the Iraqi forces just days before the third anniversary of the start of the war. That said, one Iraqi role the military will start highlighting in the next few days, I imagine, is that of Iraqi intelligence. It was intel from the Iraqi military intelligence and interior ministry that the U.S. says prompted this Potemkin operation. And it will be the Iraqi intel that provides the cover for American military commanders to throw up their hands and say, "well, we thought bad guys were there." (my emphasis)
Albritton finds some bitter irony in the effort to showcase Iraqi intelligence capabilities:
But Operation Overblown should raise serious questions about how good Iraqi intelligence is. I can’t tell you how many times I’ve been told by earnest lieutenants that the Iraqis are valiant and necessary partners, "because they know the area, the people and the customs." But when I spoke to grunts and NCOs, however, they usually gave me blunter - and more colorful - reasons why the Iraqi intelligence was often, shall we say, useless. Tribal rivalries and personal feuds are still a major why Iraqis drop a dime on their neighbors.
So I guess it's fitting that on the eve of the third anniversary of a war launched on - oh, let's be generous - "faulty" intelligence, a major operation is hyped and then turns out to be less than what it appeared because of … faulty intelligence.
Pat Lang was underwhelmed at the announcement of Project Overblown:
Hey, folks, this is a small operation. It sounds like a battalion of infantry (maybe two battalions) from the 101st Airborne Division and some Iraqi police troops. In Vietnam this operation would have been too small to have been given a name. It would have just been, "what you were doing tomorrow."
But he was willing to believe initially that it was at least a real military operation:
The only thing interesting about this operation is the fact that Casey is not going to let the insurgents build another redoubt in Samarra like the one they built in Fallujah.
Juan Cole, on the other hand, picked up on at least rumors of air strikes being used:
US military aircraft delivered a mixed US and Iraqi force to four villages north of Samarra which, the US military says, are suspected guerrilla bases. Actually, Samarra and its environs have long been dominated by the guerrillas, and repeated US attempts to subdue Samarra have all failed. Some sources reported massive bombing, which the Pentagon denied. Local Iraqis said they heard big explosions, however.
He also has a comparison to Fallujah:
This Samarra operation is probably mainly a political act. The US generals are attempting to demonstrate to their Shiite allies that they take seriously the terror attack on the Askari Shrine on Feb. 22. Presumably they are also attempting to ensure that if the shrine is rebuilt, it won't just be blown up again. Short of pulling a Fallujah on Samarra, however - which would involve emptying the city and then destroying it - it is difficult to see how the US/ Iraqi government forces can prevail. Even then, they would just face sullen suicide bombers thereafter, as has happened in Fallujah, where 2/3s of the buildings were damaged and a large part of the population permanently dispossessed.
Frankly, the Samarra "Operation Swarm" is probably also meant to give the impression of progress or at least of activity in Iraq, where the political process is stalled and the guerrillas seem to strike at will, with increasing political success.
Finally, Albritton notes something I touched on in the earlier post:
Also, it’s a telling example of how "well" things are going in Iraq that after three years, the U.S. is still leading the fight and conducting sweeps in an area that has been swept/contained/pacfied/cleared five or six times since 2004. How long before the U.S. has to come back again?
