Think the U.S. military isn't serious about war with Iran?
Since at least 2003, in response to a number of directives from Secretary Rumsfeld and then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Richard Myers, the military services and Pentagon intelligence agencies have been newly working on a number of "near term" and "near-year" Iranian contingency studies in support of CENTCOM war planning efforts.
These studies, war games, and modeling efforts have been the first step in shifting the bulk of planning from almost exclusive focus on Iraq to Iran. At CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida, at Army and Air Force CENTCOM support headquarters in Georgia and South Carolina, and at service analysis and operations research organizations like the Army Concepts Analysis Agency in Bethesda, a monumental effort has been underway to "build" an Iran country baseline for war planning.
Arkin reminds us that the stock response by the Pentagon when asked about specific war plans is to make them sound like part of routine planning. Like with Iraq:
Throughout mid-2002, when a similar public debate about an Iraq war plan swirled in the news, Secretary Rumsfeld, Myers, and then CENTCOM commander Gen. Tommy Franks insisted that there were no "war plans," that they hadn't been asked to prepare a war plan, that no decisions had been made, that no war plan sat on the President's desk.
Arkin makes an important point about the drawback of such secrecy. Referring to the buildup to the Iraq War, he writes:
It would take a doctoral dissertation to wade through the chronology of statements and actions to sort out the specifics of the truth, but here is the reality: Iraq war planning consumed the government inner circle all through this period and the government made a knee jerk decision -- never really thoughtfully reviewed -- not to speak about it. "We don't discuss war plans," the mantra goes. And it is dead wrong.
Maybe history will show that the Bush administration was so hell bent on war in 2002-2003, nothing that Saddam Hussein could have done would have prevented it. Still the world went through the motions of U.N. inspections and the Security Council and the U.S. Congress made decisions based upon the allusion that war could still be averted, that all diplomatic options would be exhausted before the decision to go to war was made.
We now also know that the Iraqis themselves didn't quite believe that the United States was serious about regime change and that it would go all the way. Perhaps though, had the United States candidly stated its intentions rather than spending so much time denying reality, Baghdad would have gotten the message and war would have been averted, perhaps in another time and place.
Arkin is still an optimist, though, on the Bush administration's short-range intentions:
As I've said before in these pages, I don't believe that the United States is planning to imminently attack Iran, and I specifically don't think so because Iran doesn't have nuclear weapons and it hasn't lashed out militarily against anyone.
But the United States military is really, really getting ready, building war plans and options, studying maps, shifting its thinking.
But he has the old-fashioned idea that the public of a democracy should be reasonably informed about what their elected government is planning to do on critical issues of war and peace:
Iran needs to know the facts and the American public need to know the facts. But most important, the American public needs to hear the facts about American war plans, military options and preparedness from the government so that they can understand where we are and decide whether they think the threat from Iran justifies the risks of another war.
