Jim Lobe writes that "a broad consensus" is emerging among the U.S. political elite" that Iran is behind all the troubles to which Israel is responding in its attacks on Gaza and Lebanon. (Mideast Conflict Boosts Chances of Iran-US Showdown Inter Press Service 07/19/06) One of the most prominent elements of that narrative is the timing of Hizbollah's July 12 capture (or "kidnapping", if you prefer) of two Israeli soldiers. William Kristol might be slightly more delusional than the rest of the advocates of US war against Iran (see Tom Tomorrow, Oh. My. God. This Modern World blog, 7/19/06, but he's by no means alone.
Before the US goes charging off to the cakewalk in Iran where happy Persians will be dancing in the streets of Teheran and showering our soldiers with flowers, it's worth considering that the July 12 story may not be such obvious evidence of Iran giving close direction to Hizbollah on that action.
The operation to kidnap Israeli soldiers took months of planning with Hizbullah's battle-hardened fighters staking out the Lebanese border looking for weaknesses. ...
Hizbullah had made it known for months that it was interested in kidnapping Israeli soldiers to exchange for prisoners. It even launched a well-planned assault on an Israeli position last November with the intention of snatching soldiers. The bid failed, however.
Although a fresh kidnapping was bound to incur a massive response from Israel and the wrath of non-Shiite Lebanese, analysts believe that Hizbullah and its Iranian patron calculated that the Shiite group would prevail.
"Quite frankly, they don't care" about the views of non-Shiite Lebanese, says Saad-Ghorayeb, as long as they have the support of their own constituency.
In June, the Israeli government became embroiled in the Gaza kidnap crisis, and for Hizbullah and its allies it appeared an opportune moment to strike again, opening a new front and placing additional pressure on Mr. Olmert. (my emphasis)
Obviously - or I would hope it's obvious - this doesn't prove that Iran was not directly involved in the July 12 incident.
It's just a reminder that our current experience in the Iraq War should make everyone more cautious about rushing into a direct military conflict with Iran based on thinly-sourced or fradulent intelligence claims. Both the Cheney-Bush administration and the Israeli government were wrong about their claims on Iraq's nonexistent WMDs.
Iran is no imminent military threat to the US. At this point, they can hardly be said to be a distant threat.
Iran actively supported the US goals in Afghanistan, though now they've re-established a sphere of influence in neighboring Herat province, which is largely Shi'a. Iran has also supported the US-backed election process in Iraq, rightly assuming it would put a pro-Iranian, Shi'a-majority government in power in Baghdad.
An American or Israeli direct attack on Iran would change that immediately. With 130,000 soldiers stuck in a lost war in Iraq, Iran can make itself an immediate meance to those soldiers. As William Lind says, "war with Iran ... could easily cost America the army it now has deplyed in Iraq." (The Summer of 1914 Antiwar.com 07/19/06)
The prime minister of Iraq's pro-Iranian, Shi'a-dominated government, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, condemned Israel's actions in Lebanon: Iraqi Prime Minister Denounces Israel’s Actions by Edward Wong and Michael Slackman New York Times 07/20/06.
“The Israeli attacks and airstrikes are completely destroying Lebanon’s infrastructure,” Mr. Maliki said at an afternoon news conference inside the fortified Green Zone, which houses the American Embassy and the seat of the Iraqi government. “I condemn these aggressions and call on the Arab League foreign ministers’ meeting in Cairo to take quick action to stop these aggressions. We call on the world to take quick stands to stop the Israeli aggression.”
The American Embassy did not provide an immediate response.
The comments by Mr. Maliki, a Shiite Arab whose party has close ties to Iran, were noticeably stronger than those made by Sunni Arab governments in recent days. Those governments have refused to take an unequivocal stand on Lebanon, reflecting their concern about the growing influence of Iran, which has a Shiite majority and has been accused by Israel of providing weapons to Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite militant group.
Bush's giving the red light to Israel to bomb Lebanon and intervene with ground troops has the short-term effect of aligning the US exclusively with Israel in this conflict. In both the short and long terms, it seriously reduces the United States' ability to mediate Middle Eastern conflicts.
Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz all but explicitly stated that the Cheney-Bush administration specifically backs Israel's decision to attack civilian neighborhhoods, infrastructure and vehicles (Peretz hints a ground operation in LebanonHa'aretz 07/20/06):
"The Israel Defense Forces does not mean to harm the civilian population but there is no way that an organization which using the civilian population can think that it has a security guarantee," Peretz continued. "We intend to continue acting under the protection of international support."
Since the United States is the main "international support" Israel has, it's hard to see how Peretz would have meant anyone other than the US, whether or not his implication is accurate.
Israeli spokespeople have made contrdictory statements about their war goals in Lebanon. Some of them have said the goal is to completely disarm Hizbollah. At least one official I've seen quoted said the goal was to degrade Hizbollah's capabilities, a considerably more modest and much more flexible goal.
Both Israel and Hizbollah are deliberately targeting civilian areas and are committing war crimes. Much of the American commentary on war crimes generally is sadly ill-informed. (See Steve Gilliard, Another day, another attack The News Blog 07/17/06 for an example, involving another blogger who is generally well-informed and sensible on issues; though apparently not this one.)
But war crimes by either side do not justify war crimes by the other. Despite the sophomoric (or worse) arguments we commonly see about this, it's a basic legal and moral point.
One of the lessons of the Israeli-Lebanese war that will be studies closely is the relative effectiveness of air power compared to ground troops. It's very likely that Israel will wind up making a massive ground incursion/invasion. Ariv Shavit writes in An aerial warHa'aretz 07/20/06:
There will be no resolution from the air, even if the pilots ultimately manage to locate Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah and kill him. Despite the media euphoria and the patriotic spin, the aerial war led by Chief of Staff Dan Halutz is not heading for victory. In the best case, it is heading for a limited military achievement.
Following the humiliation of the ground forces by abductions in the north and south, the air force strikes are straightening the national spine and arousing combative instincts. But the hard truth is that the air force's hammer blows are hitting Lebanon harder than they are hitting Hezbollah. At least two-thirds of Nasrallah's war machine remains intact. The achievements in curbing the Katyusha fire are insufficient. There is no chance of dismantling the guerrilla army in a matter of days. ...
It portends a new war, a much tougher one, which will happen suddenly within a short time. ...
Israeli leaders who have not considered this will discover in the coming days the disadvantages and limitations of the aerial offensive. Then they will be faced with a tough dilemma: Should they finish off the aerial operation with a diplomatic process, which is liable to rehabilitate Hezbollah, or should they finish it off with a ground operation that could involve heavy losses and entanglement in Lebanon?
One way or the other, the illusion of a magic solution is about to burst. The Israel Air Force is trying - but not succeeding - to do all the work on our behalf.
Amos Harel in Hezbollah is still showing no signs of breakingHa'aretz 07/20/06 gives an idea of why air power can't do it all for the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF); this passage also raises a question about whether Hizbollah's standard practice really is to hide missile-launchers in civilian houses, as Israeli spokespeople are claiming:
The air force's first assault last week, aimed at long-range rockets in central Lebanon, caused considerable damage. Now the army is conducting a series of small ground operations to trace launchers in the thicket close to the border. The soldiers in the Maroun Ras area found a compound in a forest, complete with weapons bunkers, shelters and launchers that had been prepared a long time in advance. From here, rockets were launched at Safed, Ma'alot and the Miron Air Force base. The Hezbollah group hiding there surprised the IDF force and in the close-range fire exchange, two Israeli soldiers and two Hezbollah members were killed.
This incident illustrates three things. First, that like the IDF, Hezbollah too has been preparing for this confrontation for six years; second, that not everything can be done from the air. Third, that such a ground operation involves quite a few casualties and the government will have to consider this fact if it decides on a more massive invasion in the future. ...
European diplomats believe Israel has maneuvered itself into a trap. It cannot stop the operation without having real political achievements to show its public, but prolonged fighting will seriously try its citizens' fortitude and will not guarantee the expected achievements.