No one can dismiss the role of luck, or the possibility of miracles, in war. No one can afford to count upon them. It is only luck and miracles, however, that are likely to give any side any kind of meaningful victory in Lebanon. Unless the current fighting somehow really does lead to the disarming of Hezbollah, a flood of aid to Lebanon, and a new approach to the Israeli - Palestinian war of attrition, the mid- to long-term outcome will be as bad for any apparent "victor" as the "defeated." The Israelis will lose, Hezbollah will lose, and so will everyone else.
It is all too easy to take sides at times like this, or focus on the moment, but from a strategic perspective, everyone seems headed down the wrong road. (my emphasis)
Cordesman focuses on the problems of the various actors. Israel still has a nearly 40-year-old Palestinian problem to solve in the occupied territories. There was a "Palestinian" problem before the 1967 war, but the current dilemma very much hangs on resolving the issue of the occupied territories. He writes:
Anger without peace is a recipe for asymmetric war, and even when Palestinian "burn out" and fatigue affect a majority of the population, any passivity reflected in public opinion polls is meaningless. Israel’s problem has always been a relatively small minority of angry, radicalized young men and women willing to take extreme risks and use extreme measures. Half a decade of a war of attrition since September 2000 was bad enough; withdrawal from Gaza without any end game made things worse. (my emphasis)
Cordesman also discusses Israel vs. Hizbollah.
He writes:
It is unclear what Israel's strategy was in the beginning with major strikes on the Hezbollah and Lebanon. The goal seems to have been to weaken and intimidate Hezbollah while forcing the Lebanese government and army to act. If so, the end results are likely to be just as strategically self-destructive as Sharon’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and attempts to create a Maronitedominated partner. Going too far turned a victory against the Palestinians into permanent Shi’ite hostility and gave birth to Hezbollah.
Hezbollah has now shown just how vulnerable Israel is to radical non-state actors using rockets. Its strikes have not been particularly lethal, but they have disrupted much of Northern Israel, had a major impact on the Israeli economy, and warned that any form of sanctuary near Israel's borders offers its enemies the ability to launch far more lethal rocket strikes at any target in Israel in the future. Add even the crudest chemical, biological, or radiological warhead, and the potential threat is so great that virtually any attacker can force Israel to new extremes and to trying to occupy territory or create more buffer zones. (my emphasis)
Cordesman does not foresee a happy outcome for the Israeli war and likely invasion of Lebanon:
The odds are that any Lebanese action would be a cosmetic effort to win a ceasefire. No one in the international community, including the US, wants to fight Israel’s battles for it. Everyone remembers the aftermath of 1982 and attacks on the peacekeepers. This leaves Israel stuck in Lebanon or with a ceasefire that allows its opponents to pause and regroup. This might produce the initial appearance of victory for Israel, but is scarcely a meaningful result for the level of force that Israel must use.
Here's how he sees expectations for Hizbollah:
Hezbollah may gain status as a fighter in Arab and Islamic radicals’ eyes, but it may also find over time that it has provoked deep divisions in Lebanon and a great deal of antagonism in Lebanon. It already has alienated most Arab regimes, and many will now see it as presenting a permanent risk of new conflicts and wars.
This may not matter to ideological warriors who believe that God and time is on their side. It is a strategic tragedy, and self-inflicted wound, by any other standard.
For Lebanon, he expects the following:
The prognosis is a new rise in Syrian and Iranian influence, more confessional and sectarian tension, less power to the government and army, and a much worse situation for the Lebanese people.
He judges that Iran, through its influence with Hizbollah and Hamas, has shown that it is able to cause trouble on a large scale. It has not yet shown that it can benefit from the trouble it causes.
He believes that Syria's prospects for resolving its outstanding territorial issues with Israel has been diminished.
The United States is screwed, as well:
The US will be another loser in this process. The Administration’s posture of standing aside, and bipartisan pandering in the Congress, have left the US without any effort to create the kind of international forces that might actually create a meaningful buffer between Israel and Hezbollah, or help the Lebanese government disarm it. Passively waiting for Israel to make things worse for itself does not help it.
Failing to be seen to take visible action to resolve the crisis, or even presenting an option like trying to revive the peace process, makes the US seem to be a partner to Israel with little regard for the Arab world. This is not the posture that helps in Iraq, that helps regimes in Egypt and Jordan, or helps build up support for dealing with Iran and Iraq. It is not a strategy that helps in the war on terrorism.
And he gives a good statement of why the Cheney-Bush administration's current stand is just bad:
Supporting Israel does not mean the US should not be constantly visible and aggressively active in pushing for peace. It does not mean a failure to take humanitarian action which helps restore America’s image and ease pressure on Israel. It does not mean issuing passive blank checks when an Israeli government may have the wrong strategy. Discrediting America as a key mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict through sheer inaction and inertia does not help Israel or any of America’s allies in the Arab and Muslim world. (my emphasis)
