Iraq is already in a state of serious civil war, and current efforts at political compromise and improving security at best are buying time. There is a critical risk that Iraq will drift into a major civil conflict over the coming months, see its present government fail, and/or divide or separate in some form.

The US cannot simply “stay the course,” and rely on its existing actions and strategy. It needs new options to reverse the drift towards a major civil war and political failure. There are no truly good options that can guarantee success and there are many bad ones. This paper suggests that the US should avoid unilateral options and seek to negotiate new incentives with the Iraqi government and its allies. (my emphasis)

* [Option:] Encourage/develop national unity government, strong "non-elected" leadership to replace current government

The US may have to live with realignments in Iraqi politics that cause the fall of the current government, and bypass the current political structure in some form. There are positive measures like deferring the constitution, or simply ignoring it as too divisive, that also essentially ignore the legacy of the TAL [transitional legal structure] that the US may have to react to.

There is no evidence, however, that any one in Iraq can now predict what kind of replacement leadership would really be better or that even a hint of outside interference could help develop a more competent leadership, versus trigger more internal dissent and discredit potentially competent leaders and officials. An "ugly" option.

* [Option:] Encourage/develop strong man or "coup"

The US has consistently failed to pick the right man and find the right side. The fall of Diem in Vietnam is only one example of many. No one on the inside of Iraqi politics can now predict who is really strong, and capable of leading/uniting with the right mix of ruthlessness and popular support. There is no evidence that the US has ever considered this option. It should not. Another "ugly" option. (my emphasis in bold)

American forces in Iraq are in danger of having their line of supply cut by guerrillas. Napoleon once said that "an army travels on its stomach." By that he meant that the problem of keeping an army supplied is the prerequisite for the very existence of the force. ...

American troops all over central and northern Iraq are supplied with fuel, food, and ammunition by truck convoy from a supply base hundreds of miles away in Kuwait. All but a small amount of our soldiers' supplies come into the country over roads that pass through the Shiite-dominated south of Iraq.

Until now the Shiite Arabs of Iraq have been told by their leaders to leave American forces alone. But an escalation of tensions between Iran and the US could change that overnight. Moreover, the ever-increasing violence of the civil war in Iraq can change the alignment of forces there unexpectedly.

Southern Iraq is thoroughly infiltrated by Iranian special operations forces working with Shiite militias, such as Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigades. Hostilities between Iran and the United States or a change in attitude toward US forces on the part of the Baghdad government could quickly turn the supply roads into a "shooting gallery" 400 to 800 miles long. (my emphasis)

That lack of action is eroding Iraqi citizens' and U.S. officials' confidence that Maliki's government will be able to address the problems that plague this country, a development that would leave the U.S. with virtually no policy alternative.

U.S. strategy in Iraq currently revolves around the idea that given enough time and the proper security environment, Maliki's government will take control of the country and calm the sectarian tensions that threaten to dismember it. ...

Now there's a growing chorus that Maliki's government is unlikely to ever come to terms with the country's problems, a complaint reflected in Iraqi Web logs, newspaper columns, and, U.S. civilian and military officials say, in private conversations.

"I think Maliki is trying to convince the American people that he is serious about fixing things, and he is not serious," said Saad Assim al Janabi, a former member of government loyal to Ayad Allawi, whom the United States appointed interim prime minister of Iraq in 2004. "Maliki believes he is a Shiite Muslim first and that he belongs to the Dawa Party (a mostly Shiite party). We need someone to say he belongs to all of Iraq."

Top U.S. military and civilian officials here have been raising the tenor of their complaints about the government's inaction over the past month, warning that the government has only about two months to make major changes - though they don't say what might happen if it doesn't. (my emphasis)

It's being talked about in Washington. One scenario is, the Iraqis do it themselves, some Iraqi colonel who's fed up with the whole thing, who takes over the country. And it would take the United States 48 hours to figure out how to respond, and meanwhile he's taken over everything.

The other side of the coin is, we do it ourselves, find some general up in Ramadi or somewhere, and help him take over. And he'd declare a state of emergency, and crack down. And he'd ask us to leave - that would be our exit strategy. It's a distinct possibility. I've raised this with a number of foreign service and intelligence people, and most of them - remembering the days of the coups d'etat in the Middle East - say, "Hear, hear!"

And you know what? I think Rumseld [sic] would jump on this idea in five minutes.

Nothing could say it better: "The president also listens to a lot of other voices." Not that Snow thinks that Jesus speaks to the commander-in-chief through Tim LaHaye, or anything like that.

Yet the realistic viewer Olmert knows that today's inspectors and sheriffs are not what they used to be. Bush isn't Reagan, who winked as he condemned Israel for bombing the Iraqi nuclear reactor and continued to arm Israel with the weapons that would enable it to stage the next strike. And what about Olmert? He isn't Begin. He looks at his hangars, where the F-15I fighters capable of hitting Teheran are still shining, and is not giving the order.

Instead, he holds another important discussion with Shimon Peres, Tzipi Livni, Amir Peretz, Gideon Frank from the Atomic Energy Committee, Meir Dagan from the Mossad, Amos Yadlin from IDF Intelligence, and Yuval Diskin from the Shin Bet. He'll be comforted by meetings with top security officials and by the gentiles' [apparently the US is meant] limited capabilities – until the next bad movie comes around. For the time being, he'll remain in the frustrated viewer seat and keep Dimona shrouded in fog. Because what else do the people of Israel have left? (my emphasis)